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Should Scientific Research in the Lead-up to Invention
Vitiate Obviousness under the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations: To Test or Not To Test?
Ron A. Bouchard†

II. Introduction

I. Abstract

In Canada, the availability of generic drugs owes its
pedigree to compulsory licensing. 1 As part of its perceived obligations under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS), Canada repealed its compulsory
licensing regime for pharmaceuticals in favour of
‘‘linkage regulations’’ referred to as the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) NOC Regulations
(the ‘‘NOC Regulations’’). 2 The substance and procedure
of the NOC Regulations were modelled on analogous
legislation in the United States. 3 So-called linkage regulations tie patent protection for marketed pharmaceuticals
to the drug approval process, and thus control both entry
of generic drugs into the Canadian market and access by
Canadians to affordable medication. Under the Canadian linkage regulation regime, the typical route for a
generic pharmaceutical company to obtain market
access for its product is to attack the relevant brandname pharmaceutical company’s patents for being either
invalid (on the grounds of, for example, obviousness,
anticipation, double patenting, and claims broader than
disclosure) or to claim that its product will not infringe
listed patents. Given that a substantial percentage of the
cases litigated under linkage regulations in Canada and
the United States involve allegations of invalidity based
on obviousness, 4 the test for obviousness determines, in
part, the availability of generic medications in North
America.

T

his article is an analysis of case law pertaining to
whether scientific research in the lead-up to invention should vitiate a finding of obviousness in pharmaceutical litigation under the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations (the ‘‘ NOC Regulations ’’).
The NOC Regulations belong to a class of legal instruments referred to as ‘‘linkage regulations’’ that tie patent
protection for marketed pharmaceuticals to the Canadian drug approval process. Therefore, the NOC Regulations control entry of generic drugs into the market and
access by the public to affordable medication. The issue
of testing arises out of the complex and inverse relationship between inventiveness and obviousness in patent
law such that the lower the threshold for inventive ingenuity in the patentability analysis, the higher the
threshold for parties attacking patents on grounds of
obviousness. The present analysis demonstrates there is
substantial uncertainty in Canadian jurisprudence over
what constitutes the accepted test for obviousness. Some
cases stand for the proposition that no testing whatsoever is allowed, others for the opposite proposition that
some testing is allowed, while still others purport to
follow the former while actually applying the latter. Historical cases supporting the ‘‘no testing’’ line of cases
were analysed and found to offer no strong legal precedent for this approach. It is suggested that courts adopt a
‘‘purposive test’’ for obviousness based on Canadian law
requiring patents to be construed purposively rather
than literally, federal policy underlying the NOC Regulations requiring application of regulations in a manner
that is fair and balanced to all parties, and Supreme
Court of Canada jurisprudence requiring fair, unequivocal, and predictable application of laws. The proposed
test would be consistent with appellate court jurisprudence in other jurisdictions with analogous patent legislation and policy.

When assessing the issue of obviousness, courts are
charged with addressing whether an invention is rendered obvious in light of previous disclosures. 5 This analysis involves a determination of whether the impugned
invention represents an ‘‘inventive step’’ over previously
disclosed inventions. 6 One problem that frequently
comes up in the obviousness analysis is whether or not
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experimental research or testing conducted by the patentee in order to arrive at the invention constitutes this
kind of inventive step. Under Canadian law, courts are
obliged to carry out the analysis from the perspective of a
person skilled in the relevant art casting their mind back
to the claim date. The specific question addressed in this
paper is: Should scientific research and testing conducted during the lead-up to invention automatically
vitiate a finding of obviousness for a party attacking the
patent on grounds of validity under the NOC Regulations?
The question is not an easy one. The concepts of
obviousness and inventiveness in patent law are inversely
related and linked through the inventive ingenuity of
relevant persons skilled in the art. A lower standard for
inventiveness in the patentability analysis equates to a
higher standard for obviousness for parties attacking the
patent on grounds of obviousness. Not surprisingly,
brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies seek
differing standards for inventiveness and obviousness.
Brand-name firms desire a relatively stringent standard
for inventiveness such that any research or testing undertaken to arrive at an invention will result in a patent
monopoly. Under this strict standard, a generic company
faces the fact that if evidence of testing is adduced then
its attack on patent validity must fail. By contrast, generic
firms seek a more flexible standard for inventiveness,
with the result that some testing is allowed without automatically vitiating a finding of obviousness. As will be
discussed in detail below, it is perhaps not surprising that
courts have had difficulty in grappling with this complex
issue.
The present analysis is split up into five parts. In Part
I, the case law on obviousness is canvassed with the
objective of determining whether or not there is in fact a
coherent legal approach to the issue of scientific testing
under the NOC Regulations. It is concluded that there is
substantial uncertainty in Canadian jurisprudence over
what constitutes the accepted test for obviousness under
the NOC Regulations. While many judges apply the
leading decision in Beloit v. Valmet 7 to the effect that no
testing is allowed, others judges have seen fit to allow
some testing provided it is non-inventive in nature, while
still others have expressly adopted the reasoning in
Beloit as the accepted test, yet applied the more flexible
standard to the evidence at hand. Thus, courts are delivering highly contradictory messages over what constitutes the degree of allowable testing under the obviousness rubric. Part II is an analysis of historical
precedents cited in favour of the ‘‘no testing’’ approach. It
is concluded that there is no strong jurisprudential or
scholarly grounds on which to base a finding of no
testing. Part III analyzes the implications of not having a
fair, equivocal, or predictable test for obviousness, and
the effects of this on potential litigants. It is concluded
that the constitutional requirement for fairness, predictability, and certainty in law applies to the test for obviousness, and that this requirement is breached for two
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reasons. First, because courts are releasing inconsistent
opinions on the issue (no testing versus some testing)
and the opinions themselves are internally inconsistent
(courts say they are applying one standard but actually
apply another). Secondly, because judicial reasoning on
the inventive capacity of persons skilled in the art contravenes normative practices in the pharmaceutical
industry, which in turn unfairly biases the legal test for
obviousness in favour of patentees. Part IV contains recommendations for law reform. A purposive approach to
obviousness is proposed which focuses not on binary
notions of testing/no testing, but rather on the essence
and context of inventive activity leading up to invention
from the vantage point of the skilled technician. The
decision of Justice Gibson in Bristol Myers Squibb v.
Novopharm 8 is used as an example of how the central
elements of a purposive construction might be applied
to the test for obviousness. Finally, Part V discusses application of the purposive approach to pharmaceutical litigation conducted outside the umbrella of the NOC Regulations.

III. Statutory Requirement and
Classical Test

B

y 1996 amendment to the Patent Act 9 (the ‘‘Act’’), a
statutory requirement for obviousness came into
force for patent applications after October 1, 1989. 10 Section 28.3 of the Act does not however provide a statutory
definition of obviousness beyond reference to relevant
persons skilled in the art. As noted by the courts 11 and
practitioners, 12 the common law test prior to codification has continued to be applied.
The leading common law test for obviousness in
Canada was articulated by Justice Hugessen in Beloit v.
Valmet:
The test for obviousness is not to ask what competent
inventors did or would have done to solve the problem.
Inventors are by definition inventive. The classical touchstone for obviousness is the technician skilled in the art but
having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination; a paragon of deduction and dexterity, wholly devoid of intuition;
a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right. The question to be asked is whether this mythical creature (the man
in the Clapham omnibus of patent law) would, in the light
of the state of the art and of common general knowledge as
at the claimed date of invention, have come directly and
without difficulty to the solution taught by the patent. It is a
very difficult test to satisfy. . .
Every invention is obvious after it has been made, and
to no one more so than an expert in the field. Where the
expert has been hired for the purpose of testifying, his infallible hindsight is even more suspect. It is so easy, once the
teaching of a patent is known, to say, ‘‘I could have done
that’’; before the assertion can be given any weight, one
must have a satisfactory answer to the question, ‘‘Why didn’t
you?’’ 13

Thus, for Justice Hugessen, and the considerable
corpus of patent law relating to the obviousness test
relying on his judgment, 14 there are only two perspec-
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tives from which to view a patent: that of an inventor,
and that of a person skilled in the art. One is completely
inventive while the other is not inventive at all. The
obviousness test is to be gauged only by the latter. As we
shall see below however, the lack of convergence
between the judicial construction of persons skilled in
the art and actual skilled technicians in the global pharmaceutical industry has led to considerable judicial
manipulation of the case law in order to get around the
restrictive language of Beloit.

conducted in the laboratory or within the confines of a
library or presumably even on the Internet. This passage
has a substantial history in the judicial analysis of obviousness in Canada. 18 The second line of cases involve the
notion that if more than a ‘‘mere scintilla’’ of inventiveness is exercised on the road to invention, 19 then the
invention cannot be obvious. Both lines of cases are
summarized in Table 1 infra. Applied together, they
result in a high barrier for parties alleging invalidity
based on obviousness, leading Justice Hugessen in Beloit
to say ‘‘it is a very difficult test to satisfy’’. 20

IV. Analysis

The high watermark in pharmaceutical or chemical
cases for the stringent standard is Justice Lederman’s trial
decision in Bayer v. Apotex, 21 In Bayer, the obviousness
analysis focused on three interrelated issues: the ‘‘no
testing’’ approach to obviousness and the related ‘‘worth
a try’’ obviousness formulation, and whether a person
skilled in the art ‘‘would have’’ or ‘‘could have’’ arrived at
the impugned invention. The case involved a compulsory license for nifedipine, a dihydropyridine Ca 2+
channel blocker used in the treatment of various cardiovascular disorders. The issue of validity revolved around
nifedipine’s poor activity as a solid dosage form, poor
solubility in water as a liquid form, and significant light
sensitivity; all of which led to difficulties in arriving at a
dosage form with good bioavailability and rapid onset of
action.

Part I: NOC Case Law

A

review of pharmaceutical case law demonstrates
there is substantial confusion in Canadian courts
regarding the amount of scientific research during the
lead-up to invention allowed to be contemplated in the
obviousness analysis by persons skilled in the art. On one
hand, many judges have articulated a stringent standard
of ‘‘no experimentation or serious thought’’ (‘‘no testing’’
for shorthand) while others have taken a more flexible
approach, allowing testing that is ‘‘due’’, ‘‘mechanical’’, or
‘‘routine’’ without vitiating the obviousness attack.
Adding to the confusion is the fact that still other courts
have articulated one standard while silently applying the
other. Thus it is hardly surprising that one recent decision involved the application of a much less stringent
test under anticipation than under obviousness, which is
traditionally a much harder ground of attack to make
out in patent litigation. 15 Part I of the analysis is therefore
broken up into three sections: (a) decisions that apply the
stringent standard, (b) decisions applying the more flexible standard, and (c) decisions that claim to follow the
former approach but apply the latter.
(a) Stringent Standard
As noted above, the test articulated in Beloit does
not refer explicitly to scientific research or testing, in the
lead-up to invention or otherwise. The origin of the
stringent standard can be traced back to two lines of
historical cases. 16 The first comprises legal commentary
by Professor Harold Fox to the effect that no testing
whatsoever can be carried out in the context of the
obviousness analysis:
In order that a thing shall be ‘‘obvious’’ it must be
something that would directly occur to someone who was
searching for some-thing novel, a new manufacture, or
whatever it might be, without the necessity of his having to
do any experimenting or serious thought, or research,
whether the research be in the laboratory or amongst literature. 17

In this formulation, the standard for scientific
research or testing that vitiates the obviousness attack is
very stringent. Not only is no experimenting, serious
thought or research whatsoever allowed under the obviousness test, but this includes all research, whether it is

Apotex argued that the invention set out in Canadian Patent No. 981,582 (the ’582 patent) was obvious
given the disclosure in a South African patent application that nifedipine could be used to treat acute angina
when administered either intravenously or orally and
that it worked like nitrates, e.g., nitroglycerin. Apotex
contended it was obvious to put nifedipine in liquid
form and then encase the solution in a soft gelatin capsule in order to deliver it perlingually, as had been previously done for nitroglycerin. Given the relevant prior art
and common knowledge attributed to persons skilled in
the art of pharmaceutical science, problems overcome by
the ’582 patent, such as light sensitivity and insolubility
could easily be overcome through routine trial and error
testing. Apotex argued that such testing would be routine workshop activity and therefore would involve no
inventive ingenuity. 22
Apotex made out its case based on the ground that
testing conducted in the work-up phase to the invention
by persons skilled in the art constituted non-inventive or
obvious testing. However, Justice Lederman rejected this
approach, citing the Federal Court’s decision in Cabot
Corp. v. 318062 Ont. 23 (citing Fox) to the effect that no
testing could be undertaken in the context of obviousness. This was true even under conditions where the
impugned testing was both logical and reasonable in
light of the prior art. 24 A second ground offered by Justice Lederman was based on his interpretation of the
inventive capacity of relevant persons skilled in the art
articulated in Beloit. In particular he relied on the pro-
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position that persons skilled in the art are to be construed as having ‘‘no scintilla’’ of inventiveness, imagination, or intuition. 25 Such a person would, quite
obviously, undertake no testing in order to arrive at an
invention. The notion that even a mere scintilla of invention is sufficient to justify patentability in the context of
a validity attack has a long history in Canada 26 and the
United Kingdom. 27
Rather than addressing the issue of testing
directly, 28 Justice Lederman re-phrased Apotex’s argument as ‘‘worth a try’’ rather than the routine experimentation or workshop improvement approach advocated
by Apotex. 29 As noted above, this formulation is a logical
extension of the ‘‘no testing’’ approach; by definition the
worth a try approach would allow some testing. Justice
Lederman also expressed an abundance of caution
relating to the issue of hindsight. 30 However, the worth a
try approach to obviousness differs significantly from
one addressing the issue of routine experimentation.
While it minimizes hindsight error it does so at the cost
of allowing a person skilled in the art to make an
informed decision as to whether or not an invention is
obvious based on the evidence before the court as of the
claim date. As such, it minimizes the role of persons
skilled in the art in the obviousness determination,
which is then left in the hands of the presiding judge. As
discussed more fully below, this contradicts the requirements of section 28.3 of the Act, which stipulates that
persons skilled in the art are to provide the lens through
which the judiciary must gaze when addressing the issue
of obviousness.
A second important aspect of the decision in Bayer
was the court’s distinction between whether a person
skilled in the art ‘‘would have’’ or ‘‘could have’’ arrived at
the invention based on prior art. As with the worth a try
approach, favouring the term ‘‘would’’ over ‘‘could’’ can
be seen as an extension of the no testing approach, as
clearly one of these terms encompasses some testing
while the other does not. The Federal Court of Appeal’s
‘‘cling free’’ case 31 was cited as authority for the could
versus would distinction. However, this distinction was
never made by Justice Urie in Beecham. 32 Indeed, not
only was it not made, but it can be argued that Beecham
is cited primarily in the case law for the proposition that
to be obvious a person skilled in the art must come
directly and without difficulty to the solution taught by
the patent. The distinction by Justice Lederman between
whether a person skilled in the art would versus could
have arrived at the invention has been applied in many
subsequent cases. 33
In rejecting any allowances for testing, the court in
effect marginalized the skilled technician in the obviousness analysis. As noted by Justice Martland writing in
dissent in Farbwerke v. Halocarbon, 34 use of the term
‘‘would’’ in this context amounts to a rejection of the
more flexible Cripps Question, where emphasis is placed
on investigation into whether or not activity engaged in
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by the inventor crossed the line from mere workshop
activity into the realm of inventive ingenuity based on
evidence before the court as interpreted by one skilled in
the appropriate art. 35 The approach taken in Bayer
unduly benefits patentees because it minimizes the legal
burden of having to adduce evidence proving that
testing undertaken by them to arrive at the invention
would have been inventive in nature. Rather, under the
Bayer test, it need only be proved that some testing was
conducted in the lead-up to the invention, following
which a finding of obviousness is automatically vitiated.
Consequently, rejection of routine testing in favour of
the no testing approach, substitution of the former with
the worth a try approach, and reliance by the court on
the distinction between could and would all marginalize
persons skilled in the art in the obviousness analysis.
Table 1 (Appendix 1) below summarizes decisions
to date where testing was not allowed in the obviousness
analysis. As in Tables 2-3 infra, the tabulated decisions
are split up into NOC and non-NOC cases. In Table 1,
the cases are further split into the two lines of cases
underpinning the ‘‘no testing’’ approach: cases traceable
back to Fox’s explicit injunction against testing, and cases
traceable to the injunction against the exercise of more
than a ‘‘mere scintilla’’ of inventiveness.
(b) Flexible Standard
Critical to understanding why and how a skilled
formulator would (or could) contemplate testing a compound for its properties is the nature of the tacit and
focal codified knowledge 36 possessed by the ordinary
person skilled in the art in the pharmaceutical industry.
As noted by Justice Snider in a recent case involving
crystalline forms of azithromycin, pharmaceutical companies litigating under the NOC Regulations are sophisticated multinational firms, capable of rapidly and efficiently conducting all necessary research relating to the
optimal design, medical chemistry, formulation, dosage
forms, manufacturing, and storage of pharmaceutical
products. 37 Indeed, once a pharmaceutical compound
has been synthesized, it routinely undergoes considerable testing relating to each of these broad issues. 38 As
pointed out by Wolfe and colleagues in the context of
innovation clusters, 39 the life sciences industry is heavily
dependent on both synthetic and analytical knowledge
bases. 40 Unfortunately, while the identity and inventive
capacity of relevant persons skilled in the art have been
understood within the pharmaceutical industry for
many years, very few judges have made an attempt to
understand in detail the nature of the ‘‘persons’’, ‘‘skills’’,
or ‘‘art’’ in the context of cases under the NOC Regulations. Indeed it can be argued that much of the confusion in Canadian courts over the issue of testing can be
traced back to a fundamental misreading of this issue. 41
Based on the above discussion, the relationship
between inventiveness, obviousness and the inventive
capacity of persons skilled in the art is crucial to a proper
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understanding of the issue at hand, as it informs the
normative context in which ‘‘routine’’ scientific research
occurs in the pharmaceutical sector. One of the few
decisions in recent years where the issue was addressed
directly is Justice Reed’s decision in Apotex v. HoffmannLa Roche. 42 The case offers a good example of the fact
that a substantial amount of testing can be routinely
undertaken by a skilled formulator (or team of skilled
formulators) as part of the normal drug formulation
exercise:
Once a compound such as trimethoprim has been synthesized there are various tests through which it must go
before it becomes accepted as a new drug for treatment of
disease in humans. Research typically begins, as it did in this
case, with the synthesis of the new compound (or with the
isolation of that compound if the compound is one naturally occurring in nature). If this is done rationally the biochemist will likely have some idea as to the potential
properties of the compound. The compound once created is
then sent to a research facility for testing both in vitro (in
glass) and in vivo (in life). In vitro testing is that which
occurs in a test tube or more precisely in small glass saucer
shaped dishes (petrie dishes). The effectiveness of the new
compound against various types of bacteria is tested. If the
results are promising, in vivo tests are then conducted, often
using mice because the behaviour of infectious diseases in
mice parallels that in humans. Lastly the drug is tested in
humans, a stage referred to as clinical trials or clinical
testing.
In any event, once trimethoprim had been successfully
synthesized by Drs. Hitchings and Roth it was sent in May
of 1956 to Dr. Bushby at the Wellcome Research Laboratory in Beckenham, Kent, England for in vitro and in vivo
testing . . .
Testing was not without difficulty. Initially the batches
of trimethoprim were of uneven purity. The most significant difficulty however arose from a report received in September 1960 that chronic toxicity studies carried out in
dogs had found severe leucopenia, that is a severe drop in
the white blood cell count. But, those results could not be
reproduced. By December 1961 clinical trials had commenced at Hammersmith Hospital in London and Dr.
Bushby was attempting to interest other medical centres in
doing likewise. 43

As to whether such significant and ‘‘difficult’’ testing
should vitiate the obviousness attack, Justice Reed held
that evidence before the court indicated that testing of
sulphamethoxazole with trimethoprim was nothing
other than an ‘‘entirely obvious routine, indeed, mechanical step to take’’. 44 Sensibly, the amount of allowable
testing is not without limitation. As noted by Justice
Reed in a different decision, routine testing can only
render a claim invalid where it involves no inventive
step. 45 Central to the concept of allowable testing articulated by Justice Reed in both of these cases is that testing
outside the bounds of obviousness involves an inventive
step, whereas that inside the obviousness fence does not.
Although grounded in Supreme Court of Canada and
other appellate jurisprudence (cf. Table 2), this distinction has been largely ignored in cases where the more
stringent standard is applied.
Many decisions under the NOC Regulations
allowing some form of testing employ terms such as
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‘‘routine’’, ‘‘workshop’’, or ‘‘mechanical’’ testing. An
understanding of these terms is therefore central to a
pragmatic test for obviousness that is faithful to the tacit
and focal knowledge bases and normative practices
within the global pharmaceutical industry. For example,
in an early case involving a method for coating moulded
masonry, the Exchequer Court of Canada held that obviousness turns on the nature of the skills of the person
skilled in the art as they are applied to the specific task at
hand. In particular, an invention is patentable only
where it is or not ‘‘beyond the expected skill of the
calling’’ or ‘‘beyond the skill of the routineer’’. 46 In other
words, testing within the skill of the routineer is neither
inventive nor supports the traditional patent bargain.
The reasoning in Burns & Russell was relied on by
Justice Wetston in the Apotex v. Wellcome AZT trial
decision:
There is no inventiveness in following an obvious and
well-charted route using known techniques and processes
involving known compositions unless the inventor
encounters difficulties that could not have been reasonably
expected by a person versed in the art or overcome by the
application of ordinary skill: Burns & Russell of Canada v.
Day and Campbell Ltd. (1965), 48 C.P.R. 207; Genentech
Inc.’s Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 147 (C.A.). 47

This reasoning has been followed in later cases
under the NOC Regulations . For example, in
SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, the first of two ‘‘pink
hue’’ 48 cases, Justice Gibson, after citing Fox to the effect
that a person skilled in the art should be ‘‘assumed to be
a man who is going to try to achieve success and not one
looking for difficulties or seeking failure’’, stated:
Having determined that a wet formulation of paroxetine tablets gives rise to a ‘‘pink hue problem’’, a problem of
significant enough magnitude to cause a skilled person to
seek out at least a partial solution to the problem, I am
satisfied that a logical first step for a person skilled in the art
would be to turn to the alternative formulation methods
disclosed by the ’060 Patent and to determine whether each
or any of those alternative formulation methods would
solve, or at least partially solve, the problem. Such an
enquiry would, I am satisfied, involve no inventive step or
skill. It would simply involve application of the invention
taught by the ’060 Patent. 49

Thus, routine investigation of the matter at hand
includes logical, rational, or incremental steps toward
solving the problem at issue. As exemplified by the reasoning of Justice Reed in the trimethoprim decision, the
question to be answered is whether or not such steps are
inventive, e.g., nonobvious.
Similarly, in Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm, 50 a case
involving the l-isomer of the antibiotic levofloxacin, the
court allowed non-inventive testing relating to a number
of characteristics of the compound at issue, including the
(i) solubility, (ii) toxicity, and (iii) degree of antimicrobial
activity of levofloxacin compared to the previously disclosed racemic mixture of the same drug ofloxacin. Justice Mosley held that, given the previous patent on the
racemic mixture, it would have been obvious to a person
skilled in the art to conduct testing on the solubility,
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toxicity, and the degree of antimicrobial activity of the lisomer and that such testing was non-inventive. At
various points in the judgment, the court described
testing on these variables as mechanical, routine,
involving simple analytical procedures that were uncomplicated and generally accepted, and that revealed no
new uses, surprising results, or properties. 51 Therefore,
even though the exact antimicrobial, solubility, and toxicity characteristics of levofloxacin could not have been
predicted with absolute certainty without verification
through testing, these characteristics would have been
predictable or obvious to persons skilled in the art and
thus amenable to verification using routine analytical
tests available at the time of the claim date.
Table 2 in Appendix 1 below summarizes decisions
supporting some type of research or testing without
automatically vitiating a finding of obviousness.
Together, the decisions stand for the proposition that
acceptable testing is testing that falls short of inventiveness and which allows the skilled technician to come
directly and without difficulty to the invention at issue.
These cases are clearly at odds with those summarized in
Table 1.
(c) Cases That Cite Stringent Standard But Apply
Flexible Standard
Confusing the case law even further is a third line of
cases in which judges grappling with the complex evidence before them cite the stringent standard, yet, with
varying degrees of silence, go on to apply the more flexible test. For example, in the Apotex v. Wellcome AZT
trial decision, Justice Wetston specifically cited Bayer to
the effect that for an invention to be obvious, no
thought, research or experiment could be undertaken on
the road to discovery. 52 However, the standard actually
applied by the court was that of no ‘‘undue experimentation’’:
There is no inventiveness in following an obvious and
well-charted route using known techniques and processes
involving known compositions unless the inventor
encounters difficulties that could not be reasonably
expected by a person versed in the art or overcome by the
application of ordinary skill. 53

Consequently, the court accepted that some testing
could be allowed in the obviousness analysis without
vitiating a finding of obviousness. As noted earlier, Justice
Wetston’s reasoning on the issue parallels that of the
Exchequer Court in Burns & Russell in this regard. 54
Nevertheless, the court held that the proffered evidence
was overly speculative and would have entailed undue
experimentation in order to arrive at the impugned
invention. 55 Even so, Justice Wetston clearly left open the
possibility that testing would not per se obviate a finding
of obviousness. Thus, it is not surprising that many of the
cases in Tables 2 and 3 refer to this decision.
Similarly, in a case involving the selective serotonin
re-uptake inhibitor (SSRI) sertraline for panic and obsessive-compulsive disorder, the court stipulated that the

threshold for testing was ‘‘crystal clear and without the
need for experimenting or serious thought’’. 56 However,
the court went on to find that no inventive ingenuity or
‘‘undue experimentation’’ was exercised in prescribing
sertraline for panic disorder or obsessive compulsive disorder:
Those articles teach, prior to the effective date, that
current research suggested that SSRIs were logical candidates for use with OCD patients, that sertraline was in
clinical trials as a treatment for OCD, that the balance of the
evidence suggested SSRIs are effective in PD and preliminary results warrant investigating sertraline for PD. On the
basis of this literature no inventive ingenuity, or undue
experimentation was required in order to prescribe sertraline for the treatment of PD or OCD. To paraphrase Mr.
Justice Wetston in Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd,
supra, there was no inventiveness in following an obvious
and well-charted route using known techniques and known
compositions unless unexpected difficulties were encountered. 57

A similar result was obtained in the second of two
cases involving the proton pump inhibitor omeprazole,
AB Hassle v. Genpharm. 58 While Justice Layden-Stevenson stated clearly that for an invention to be obvious
it must occur directly to the skilled person ‘‘without
serious thought, research or experiment’’, 59 the test she
actually applied was that in the AZT trial decision to the
effect that there is no inventiveness in following an
obvious and well-charted route using known techniques
and processes involving known compositions unless the
inventor encounters difficulties that could not have been
reasonably expected by a person versed in the art, or
overcome by the application of ordinary skill. Justice
Layden-Stevenson found that nothing in Apotex’s evidence indicated that testing conducted by Hassle was
routine and, therefore, the invention was not obvious. 60
Thus, while the court was willing to apply a more liberal
test than did Justice Campbell in the first omeprazole
decision, 61 evidence adduced by Apotex was, as in that
case, simply insufficient to demonstrate obviousness.
Another case on point is Novartis v. Apotex. 62
Novartis involved formulations of cyclosporin purported
to solve the problem of poor bioavailability through the
use of concentrated microemulsions. The ’150 patent
held by Novartis was invalid on grounds of anticipation,
obviousness, and because the claims were deemed
broader than the disclosure. The court dealt extensively
with the issue of the skilled formulator and what would
or would not be properly construed as part of the
normal formulation exercise. Based on the facts before
the court there were as many as four separate steps to go
from the prior art to the invention. The main issue was
phrased as follows:
. . . Apotex alleges that the technician skilled in the art with
the teachings of the two ’667 and ’307 patents would understand that to improve the stability and the bioavailability
produced by the delivery system of these patents, a
microemulsion process would be needed so that a formulation of a high surface area of oil in contact with water which
permits the cyclosporin to partition into the water and be
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absorbed across intestinal mucosa into the bloodstream,
would result.
The key question is whether the formulator skilled in
the art would be aware that the smaller the droplets’ size,
the higher the surface area of contact between oil and water
enhance, and thus, the better the drug blood levels that
result. 63

Laying the groundwork for his analysis, Justice Blais
cited with approval the ‘‘worth a try’’ approach articulated in Bayer and Fox’s statement that to be obvious an
invention must be arrived at without any experimenting,
serious thought or research. However, Justice Blais did
not hold that testing engaged in by Novartis was per se
inventive. Rather, he addressed several complex and
lengthy aspects of the evidence that shed important light
on what a person skilled in the art would have known
and grappled with, presumably in the absence of inventive ingenuity. 64 The not-insignificant exercise the skilled
formulator faced in attempting to solve the problem
before the court involved several overlapping considerations, including that compositions of cyclosporin within
the claimed patents would be in the form of a preconcentrated microemulsion, that such emulsions
increase the rate of mass transfer of cyclosporin from the
oil to aqueous phase, that such an increase would be
inversely related to emulsion droplet size, and in turn
result in increased bioavailability of the drug in a
patient’s body:
Apotex suggests that in view of the teachings of the ’667
and ’307 patents and the literature available, a skilled formulator would understand that well formulated compositions
within the scope of the ’667 and ’307 patents would be a
microemulsion preconcentrate as claimed in claim 1 of the
’150 patent and it follows that emulsion and microemulsion
systems were developed as a means to increase the mass
transfer rates of the drug to the aqueous phase. It was also
well known that the rates of the mass transfer of the drug to
the aqueous phase would increase as the size of the oil
droplets decreased, e.g., the smaller the droplets’ size, the
higher the surface area of contact between oil and water
enhance, and thus, the better the drug blood levels. The real
question is whether every formulator skilled in the art
should know that the higher [the] surface area of the dispersed phase (oil in water), that is a small particle size emulsion, the greater the absorption/bioavailability.
Apotex suggests that the emulsion and the microemulsion processes were commonly known in the industry and
that the formulators skilled in the art were aware of these
processes at the time of the patent. 65

From this passage it can be gleaned that based on
known art regarding (a) microemulsion systems and (b)
the relationship between the size of emulsion droplets to
mass transfer rates, the skilled formulator would have
known that: (i) reducing droplet size would increase
droplet surface area, and (ii) that this increase in surface
area would result in an increase in bioavailability due to
(iii) increased absorption, and that all of the above might
(iv) solve known problems with cyclosporin bioavailability. Based on this and other evidence before the
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court, the court held that testing engaged in by Novartis
was not inventive and therefore that the invention was
obvious. 66
A similar result was obtained in two decisions
involving the ␤ adrenoceptor antagonist carvedilol for
congestive heart failure 67 and the antibiotic azithromycin. 68 In the latter decision, Justice Mosley stated that
no ‘‘experimentation or research’’ is permissible under
the obviousness test. 69 However, later in his reasons he
actually found that the testing by Pfizer in order to prove
that its dosage form of azithromycin did not demonstrate a food effect was routine and did not constitute
undue experimentation. 70 Consequently, the invention
was obvious. Similarly, in Glaxosmithkline, Justice Noël
cited Bayer and Fox to the effect that no research whatsoever could be undertaken in the obviousness test, 71 but
actually found that testing undertaken by GSK constituted non-inventive testing, with the result that the
invention was obvious. 72
A summary of cases where judges cite the stringent
standard as authority, but then go on to apply the more
flexible standard is provided in Table 3 in the Appendix
below. It is clear that a significant number of cases fall
into this category.

(d) Summary
As can be seen from the data in Tables 1-3 and
discussion thereof in the text, there are three divergent
lines of case law pertaining to obviousness in Canada
under the NOC Regulations: (i) those that adopt a stringent ‘‘no-testing’’ approach; (ii) those that adopt a flexible
approach; and (iii) those that appear to adopt the former
approach but actually apply the latter. The cases underpinning the no testing approach can themselves be split
into two groups. The first can be traced back to Professor
Fox’s legal commentary on this topic, while the second
can be traced back to the intersection of obviousness and
inventiveness and the injunction against the exercise of
even a mere scintilla of inventive ingenuity by persons
skilled in the art. The remainder of this article will concentrate on the former line of cases; the second is dealt
with in forthcoming work. 73 Together, they are often
referred to in NOC jurisprudence as the ‘‘accepted
approach’’ to obviousness. This seems to conflict however with the data in Tables 2 and 3, which indicate the
presence of two other distinct (and growing) contrary
lines of jurisprudence. The only conclusion one can
draw from this analysis is that while Fox, Beloit and
Bayer are routinely cited as leading authority on the
issue of testing there is no single authoritative line of
jurisprudence indicating whether or not scientific testing
in the lead-up period to an invention should vitiate a
finding of obviousness. As such, there is considerable
confusion in Canadian courts on this issue.
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Part II: Harold Fox Was Wise But Wrong
on the Issue of Testing
(a) Case Law
From Part I of the analysis it is clear that the stringent or strict approach to obviousness in Canada owes its
legitimacy in large part to legal commentary by Harold
Fox. It is beyond question that Professor Fox was a
leading figure of intellectual property law in Canada. His
textbooks are mainstays of patent analysis 74 and, as
reflected in the case law described above, he continues to
be heavily cited to this day. As a reminder, Professor
Fox’s precedent-setting passage on obviousness is as follows:
In order that a thing shall be ‘‘obvious’’ it must be
something that would directly occur to someone who was
searching for something novel, a new manufacture, or
whatever it might be, without the necessity of his having to
do any experimenting or serious thought, or research,
whether the research be in the laboratory or amongst literature. 75

It is obvious that for Fox, no research whatsoever
during the lead-up period to an invention can be permitted in order to arrive at a conclusion of obviousness.
However, while it continues to be cited verbatim in both
NOC and non-NOC decisions, there are serious
problems with the issue of testing as dealt with by Professor Fox.
To begin with, the test for obviousness is not unlike
that for anticipation even though the legal requirements
for both otherwise differ significantly. 76 Indeed, obviousness and anticipation constitute separate and distinct
legal requirements under Canadian, American, and
British patent law. However, Fox’s position on anticipation parallels his injunction against experimenting in the
obviousness analysis: inventive ingenuity in an invention
exists where experiments were necessary to show
whether or not it could be usefully carried out. 77 In other
words, experimentation trumps a finding of anticipation.
Consequently, the test for obviousness can be conflated
into that for anticipation. As noted by Justice Hughes in
a recent NOC case involving levofloxacin, the lack of
inventiveness attributed to persons skilled in the art in
cases employing the stringent standard comes ‘‘perilously
close’’ to that for anticipation, with the result that obviousness is ‘‘little different than a consideration of anticipation’’. 78 Ambiguity of this nature is likely responsible
for the counter-intuitive (but not impossible) finding
that a patent can be anticipated but not obvious over the
prior art. 79
A second caveat regarding Fox’s obviousness analysis
is the narrow scope of case law cited in support of the
stringent standard. Indeed, three of the four cases cited
by Fox were decided by a single judge, Justice Maclean of
the Exchequer Court, and there are questionable elements of Justice McLean’s analysis in these cases that
seem to have gone unnoticed. For example, paragraph 21
of Short Milling v. Weston, 80 reproduced in its entirety

below, represents all of Justice Maclean’s analysis on
obviousness. As is clear from the passage, no review of
law applicable to obviousness was undertaken:
That there is invention in the bleaching agent disclosed
by Haas, and his process or processes of producing the same,
is not, I think, subject to any serious doubt, assuming for the
moment that anticipation is not to be found in any of the
prior art cited, and this will be considered presently. I think
Haas undoubtedly made an important discovery, and as the
result of substantial and original research and experimental
work he has disclosed a process or processes, or means, for
translating his discovery into practical and useful ends,
something that was not, I think, done before. The bleaching
of flour or dough, and the production of a white loaf of
bread, was and is being successfully attained by the use of
the bleaching agent prepared according to the process, and
by the means, described by Haas. This was, I think, something novel and useful, particularly because of its adaptability for use in bakeries as already mentioned, and I do not
think there is any fair ground upon which it should be
denied the merit of a patentable invention, unless, as I have
already stated, anticipation of it has been definitely established. There would not seem to be any room for saying that
Haas was something obvious. In order that a thing shall be
‘‘obvious,’’ it must be something that would directly occur
to someone who was searching for something novel, a new
manufacture or whatever it might be, without the necessity
of his having to do any experimenting or research, whether
the research be in the laboratory or amongst literature. Haas
discovered the existence of a flour bleaching enzyme in the
soy-bean, he disclosed a process, and the sequence of the
various steps in that process, by which a bleaching agent
could best be made therefrom for commerce, and the property that it will have when so made or manufactured, and
none of these things can, I think, be said to have been
obvious. 81

The statement by Justice Maclean to the effect of
‘‘no experimenting or research’’ thus sits somewhat
uncomfortably as a bald statement with no apparent
precedent in Canadian law.
Neither of the two remaining decisions by Justice
Maclean 82 entails a review of, or even mentions, previous
case law pertaining to obviousness. Tellingly, these cases
are never cited in later decisions supporting the stringent
standard: only the passage by Professor Fox is quoted,
minus any reference to the cases cited by him. Confusing
elements of Justice Maclean’s reasoning in Short Milling
have not escaped judicial notice, as revealed by the following passage from the decision of Justice Collier of the
Federal Court in Xerox v. IBM.:
. . . Maclean, J., in J.R. Short Milling Company (Canada) Ltd.
v. Geo Weston Bread and Cakes Ltd., et al., [1941] Ex.C.R.
69, at 86, used this test:
In order that a thing shall be ‘‘obvious’’, it must be
something that would directly occur to someone who
was searching for something novel, a new manufacture
or whatever it might be, without the necessity of his
having to do any experimenting or research, whether the
research be in the laboratory or amongst literature.
I have some reservations about the phrase ‘‘whether the
research be in the laboratory or amongst literature’’, having
in mind the putting in evidence, in proof of this defence, of
the so-called ‘‘prior art’’. Maclean, J’s expression ‘‘directly
occur’’ is, to my mind, a useful one. The form of question
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occasionally used at this trial was to this effect: Would an
ordinary skilled workman (at the relevant date) have been
led directly and without difficulty to . . . ? That inquiry, I
think, embraces the essence of the test formulated by
Maclean, J. 83

literature’’ vitiates an obviousness attack, just that some
of either must have been involved in its opposite. Perhaps this is the logical trap that Justice Maclean fell into
when providing his reasons in Short Milling.

Fortunately, the judiciary in Canada have not followed Justice Maclean’s explicit disclaiming of
researching the literature (also found in Fox 84), as this
would obviate persons skilled in the art having legitimate legal knowledge of the prior art, one of the pillars
of the obviousness test even at the time of Short Milling.
The ‘‘directly and without difficulty’’ element of Justice
Mclean’s test refers to the ‘‘Cripps Question’’ posed by Sir
Stafford Cripps in Sharp and Dohme v. Boots. 85 It is
submitted that Justice Collier was correct in highlighting
this section of Justice Maclean’s decision as the essence of
the obviousness test as it was then known. It is further
submitted that Justice Maclean’s statement in Short
Milling, namely that that no experimenting or research
can be allowed under the Canadian obviousness test,
should be overruled in favour of a more pragmatic and
evidence-based test.

More important however is the fact that Justice
Angers in fact allowed a substantial degree of testing in
the case before him in Sherwin-Williams. This case
involved the validity of a patent held by General Electric
on new and improved alkyd resins and paints and
varnishes containing them. As shown by the evidence
before the court, there was significant prior art on such
resins before General Electric conducted its own
research testing on same:

It is possible that the remaining case cited by Fox
contains the seed of what may have led to the reasoning
in Short Milling. In Canadian Industries v. Sherwin-Williams, 86 Justice Angers of the Exchequer Court quotes the
following passage by Justice Rinfret in Crosley Radio
Corp. v. Canadian General Electric 87 regarding the role
of thought and experiment in the obviousness analysis:
The mere lack of obviousness is not sufficient to establish invention. There must be inventive ingenuity: see
Crosley Radio Corporation and Canadian General Electric
Company Limited, where the Honourable Mr. Justice Rinfret said (1936 SCR 551, at 555):
Notwithstanding the very ingenious and exhaustive
argument of counsel for the appellant, we would hardly
think, however, he would ask this Court to give a sacrosanct meaning to the use of the word ‘‘obvious’’ for the
purpose of discriminating between the category of
improvements which ought to be regarded as being
properly inventions in the legal sense and the category of
those not so regarded.
It has long been laid down in our courts that, in
order validly to support a patent, it was, of course, necessary that the art, or the improvement thereon, should be
new, that it must be useful and that it must not have
been anticipated by prior knowledge or prior user by
others within the meaning of sec. 7 of the Patent Act, in
force at the time of the issuance of the patent in suit; but
that something additional was also required. It was essential that there should be invention and that one did not
hold a valid subject-matter of a patent unless he showed
the exercise of the inventive faculties (See: Halsbury’s
Laws of England, vbis. Patents and Inventions, no. 288);
and that is to say, in the words of Lord Watson
(Thomson v. American Braided Wire Company (1889), 6
R.P.C. 518 H.L.), ‘‘a degree of ingenuity . . . which must
have been the result of thought and experiment’’. 88

It is clear from the passage at the bottom of the
preceding paragraph that at no point in his decision did
Justice Rinfret hold that ‘‘any experimenting or research,
whether the research be in the laboratory or amongst

Around 1901 a chemist named Watson Smith tried
reacting glycerol and phthalic anhydride. His work is
recorded in an article entitled ‘‘A new glycerol phthalate’’
which appeared in the Journal of the Society of Chemical
Industries, of November, 1901. The article in question is
mentioned in Schedule I of the amended particulars of
objection. It describes Watson Smith’s product as follows:
As characterized chiefly by its extraordinary insolubility in almost all solvents. It is practically insoluble in
alcohol ether and benzene also petroleum and petroleum spirit. Its best solvent appears to be cold acetone
but in this it is sparingly soluble. On pouring some of the
solution on a watch glass and letting it evaporate spontaneously, the clear transparent resin deposited in minute
drops, solidifying to hard transparent masses of the tasteless resinous body.
Watson Smith had evidently discovered a new synthetic
resin which however was wholly insoluble and unusable.
Yet it suggested all sorts of possibilities as an entirely new
synthetic product and, as time went on, the industry began
to consider what might be done with this new synthesis.
Around 1912 the Watson Smith resin was investigated by
chemists in the employ of General Electric Company in the
United States, their names being, among others, Callahan,
Arsem, Dawson, Howell and Friedburg. These chemists
were trying to make out of this hard glassy substance of
Watson Smith, a sample whereof was filed as exhibit 24,
something soluble in available solvents and thus industrially
useful, something they could spread on a surface as a
coating. 89

The evidence adduced clearly demonstrates that
General Electric was in the habit of conducting largescale routine research on a stable of compounds, and
that it was deemed acceptable by the court at the time
Fox was writing his book not just for one person skilled
in the art, but rather an entire team of skilled chemists
employed by this large sophisticated industrial company,
to undertake significant experimental research, and that
such research should not vitiate the obviousness attack.
Notwithstanding the extensive amount of experimental
and theoretical research conducted by the General Electric research group, Justice Angers found that the patent
was obvious in light of the prior art. The result, and the
means to get there, parallels that in the trimethoprim,
levofloxacin, cyclosporin and sertraline cases discussed
supra, where evidence of substantial testing was adduced
without automatically vitiating a finding of obviousness.
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Finally, all four of the cases cited by Fox in support
of his assertion that no testing can be contemplated in
the obviousness analysis were released between 1941
and 1945, yet the final edition (4th) of his textbook was
published in 1969. Of note is the absence of several
decisions released by the Exchequer Court of Canada
well before publication of the final edition. In particular,
the omission of Burns & Russell 90 is notable, as it figures
significantly in later decisions supporting a role for
testing (cf. Tables 2 and 3). Recall in that case that Justice
Gibson found with reference to the existing case law that
routine testing is within the skill of persons skilled in the
art and thus does not support a patent monopoly. This
reasoning was adopted in the leading case of Apotex v.
Wellcome when the court held ‘‘there is no inventiveness in following an obvious and well-charted route
using known techniques and processes involving known
compositions unless the inventor encounters difficulties
that could not have been reasonably expected by a
person versed in the art or overcome by the application
of ordinary skill’’. 91
Another early case noteworthy for having dealt
directly with the issue of testing is the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Lightning Fastener v. Colonial Fastener. 92 Justice Rinfret stated that inventions brought
about through the exercise of mechanical skill do not
involve an exercise of inventive ingenuity, and that it ‘‘is
not the object of the Patent Act to dignify by the name
of invention every slight advance in the domain of
mechanism’’. A similar distinction was made by the
Exchequer Court in Pope Appliance v. Spanish River. 93
Thus, while the need for caution in distinguishing
between inventive and non-inventive experimenting,
thought, and research had been sounded by the courts, 94
there can be little question that by 1969 there was a well
developed line of cases in Canada distinguishing the type
of routine or workshop testing advocated by Apotex in
Bayer, from inventive testing done on the road to a
patentable invention.
(b) Summary
The historical survey undertaken above casts doubt
on the legal foundations of the stringent standard for
obviousness. In the absence of strong supporting jurisprudence, Professor Fox’s commentary in and of itself
stands as poor precedent for the proposition that any
scientific testing at all in the lead-up to invention should
vitiate a finding of obviousness. Together with the two
other lines of jurisprudence relating to this issue
reviewed in Part I and summarized in Tables 2 and 3 it is
reasonable to conclude there is an absence of an unequivocal and predictable test for obviousness in Canada.
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Part III: Requirement for an Unequivocal,
Predictable, and Fair Test
(a) Implications for the Issues of Certainty and Predictability
As noted above, the case law reviewed so far indicates that there is no clear and consistent line of cases on
the issue of testing under the NOC Regulations. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has said that one of
the primary functions of law is to give the public fair
notice of the legal nature and consequences of its conduct with reasonable certainty through the fair application of laws by courts. 95As stated by Justice Gonthier in
R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, this notice
function is ‘‘broadly linked with the corpus of principles
of government known as the ‘Rule of Law’, which lies at
the core of our political and constitutional tradition’’. 96
The requirement for fairness, predictability, and certainty in law applies in two important ways to the issue
at hand. First, the case law review clearly illustrates that
there is a significant lack of certainty and predictability
with regard to the standard for testing within the obviousness rubric. This refers to the fact that courts are both
releasing inconsistent opinions on the issue (no testing
versus some testing) and opinions which are themselves
internally inconsistent (judges say they are applying one
standard but actually apply another). Secondly, courts are
adopting reasoning that flies in the face of normative
practices within the pharmaceutical industry and
applying this reasoning in a manner that inherently and
thus unfairly biases the legal test for obviousness against
second persons under the NOC Regulations.
In one of its leading patent cases, 97 the Supreme
Court of Canada stipulated that the provisions of the Act
and interpretation thereof by the judiciary should be fair
and predictable. Extending the principles enunciated in
Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical, Justice Binnie noted that
there is a certain minimal standard of predictability that
must attach to patent law jurisprudence, beyond which
significant and improper economic harm can result to
patent litigants. The court further held that it is within
the bounds of proper patent policy to maintain this minimal level of certainty and predictability and to keep it
from slipping below that threshold:
The scope of patent protection must not only be fair, it
must be reasonably predictable. A patent is, after all, a
public instrument issued under statutory authority which
may result in severe financial consequences for its infringement. The scope of its prohibition should be made clear so
that members of the public may know where they can go
with impunity. As was said in another public law connection by Gonthier J. in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical
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Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at p. 639, precision in public
enactments is required to ‘‘sufficiently delineate an area of
risk’’ . . .
The patent owner, competitors, potential infringers and
the public generally are thus entitled to clear and definite
rules as to the extent of the monopoly conferred. This in
turn requires that the subjective or discretionary element of
claims interpretation (e.g., the elusive quest for ‘‘the spirit of
the invention’’) be kept to the minimum, consistent with
giving ‘‘the inventor protection for that which he has actually in good faith invented’’ (Western Electric Co. v. Baldwin
International Radio of Canada, [1934] S.C.R. 570, at p. 574).
Predictability is achieved by tying the patentee to its claims;
fairness is achieved by interpreting those claims in an
informed and purposive way. 98

While the court was concerned with the scope of
the claims at suit, the requirement for clear and definite
rules can be legitimately extended from claim scope to
that of obviousness. Both analyses go to the heart of
patent validity; one through the proper scope of the
patent monopoly and the other through the existence of
the monopoly itself. If a court finds that a given claim or
set of claims are broader than the disclosure, then those
claims are deemed to be invalid. The same is true for
obviousness, which can result in complete invalidation
of a patent rather than invalidation on a claim by claim
basis.
It could also be argued that maintaining the
threshold for allowable testing at the current stringent
standard results in significant ‘‘chilling’’ of competition
to the benefit of patentees. This follows the resulting
ambiguity and uncertainty faced by potential litigants. In
Free World Trust, the Supreme Court of Canada held
that patent policy, not unlike competition law and
policy, should encourage and not discourage economic
activity. In particular, the court noted that an improperly
expanded patent scope results in chilling of competition
to the detriment of both competitors and the public:
The patent system is designed to advance research and
development and to encourage broader economic activity.
Achievement of these objectives is undermined however if
competitors fear to tread in the vicinity of the patent
because its scope lacks a reasonable measure of precision
and certainty. A patent of uncertain scope becomes ‘‘a
public nuisance’’ (R.C.A. Photophone, Ld. v. GaumontBritish Picture Corp. (1936), 53 R.P.C. 167 (Eng. C.A.), at
p. 195). Potential competitors are deterred from working in
areas that are not in fact covered by the patent even though
costly and protracted litigation (which in the case of patent
disputes can be very costly and protracted indeed) might
confirm that what the competitors propose to do is entirely
lawful. Potential investment is lost or otherwise directed.
Competition is ‘‘chilled’’. The patent owner is getting more
of a monopoly than the public bargained for. There is a high
economic cost attached to uncertainty and it is the proper
policy of patent law to keep it to a minimum. 99

In the pharmaceutical industry, the consequences of
this type of chilling are significant: First, as noted in Free
World Trust, patentees accrue more of a monopoly than
that bargained for by the public. This skews the balance
of patent law against potential competitors, concentrating wealth in the hands of fewer firms, and maintaining monopolistic pricing from the perspective of

11

consumers. Second, parties attacking a patent will lose
more cases under the NOC Regulations than would
otherwise occur with a fair and predictable test, which in
turn will broaden their risk zone. Third, the consequence
to the public of not having a test for obviousness that is
fair and predictable is that a significant percentage of the
population will be at risk of losing access to affordable
medications. It is known, for example, that the longer a
firm is able to maintain a dominant market position,
particularly one relating to patented pharmaceuticals, the
longer it will continue to maintain monopolistic pricing
schemes. 100 Finally, a high threshold test creates a lack of
incentive for innovation in the pharmaceutical sector,
which in turn yields fewer and less innovative products
for consumers and for potential inventors to build on.
Indeed, Varma and Abraham have described the obviousness test as the gate by which patent law minimizes
inefficient transfers of wealth under conditions where a
patentee obtains a right to exclude others from making
or using their invention, yet does not add to the store of
public knowledge when a patent is granted on obvious
subject matter. 101 The relevance of this to Canadian drug
consumers is evident in the Supreme Court of Canada’s
recent statement that it ‘‘is entirely understandable’’ that
brand-name pharmaceutical firms would avail themselves of provisions in the NOC Regulations allowing
evergreening by ‘‘adding bells and whistles to a pioneering product’’ after the original patent has expired. 102
The economic rationale for spending $10 million to
make $500 million in profit instead of spending $500
million to make $2 billion is relatively straightforward.
The result of this situation is that brand-name drug companies are strongly incented to leverage the regulations
to produce products that clearly do not benefit the
public.
(b) Implications for the Issue of Fairness
In addition to issues of certainty and predictability,
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Nova
Scotia Pharmaceutical and Free World Trust stand for
the proposition that patent law should also be ‘‘fair’’ to
all relevant parties. As noted by the court in the latter
decision, fairness is achieved by interpreting patent law
in an informed and purposive way. Indeed, this represents a second overarching reason to revisit the test for
obviousness to ensure it is ‘‘fair, unequivocal and predictable’’: a test that inherently favours patentees would run
afoul of the fairness principal, particularly where the
stated purpose and intent of the relevant enabling legislation is to balance the interests of all relevant parties and
ensure national public health interests are respected by
making affordable medication available. This concern is
particularly relevant in light of the fact that expenditures
by Canadians on prescription drugs have risen by several
hundred per cent in the last two decades, 103 with no
slowing in the growth rate expected in the future.
The purpose and intent of legislation can be
gleaned by government policy documents, including
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those referred to as Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements 104 (‘‘RIAS’’). As noted by Justice Bastarache in
Bristol-Meyers Squibb v. Canada, it is appropriate for the
court to look to a RIAS for evidence of legislative intent
with respect to the NOC Regulations. 105 There have
been several important RIAS documents relating to the
NOC Regulations, most notably in 1993 when they
came into force, in 1998 and 1999 following amendment to the NOC Regulations, and in December 2004
and June 2006 with regard to data and market exclusivity. On first pass, a reading of the 1993 RIAS suggests
the main issue at hand for legislators at the time the
regulations came into force was shoring up the rights of
patentees following the dismantling by the government
at the time of the compulsory licensing provisions. 106 For
example, the government stated:
As a general rule, judicial remedies are sufficient to
address patent infringement. However, with the enactment
of Bill C-91 the government has created an exception to
patent infringement allowing generic competitors to undertake any activities necessary to work up a submission to
obtain regulatory approval of a product. This removes a
patent right that may have otherwise been available to patentees to prevent generic competitors from obtaining such
regulatory approval of their products.
These NOC Regulations are needed to ensure this new
exception to patent infringement is not abused by generic
drug applicants seeking to sell their product in Canada
during the term of their competitor’s patent while nonetheless allowing generic competitors to undertake the regulatory approval work necessary to ensure they are in a position
to market their products immediately after the expiry of any
relevant patents. 107

However, as can be gleaned from the second paragraph supra, in addition to safeguarding the interests of
brand-name pharmaceutical firms, the government also
intended to protect the rights of generic firms under the
new regulations. The balancing function was been confirmed more explicitly in the December 2004 RIAS:
The proposed amendments are intended to restore the
balanced policy underlying the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) NOC Regulations (‘‘PM (NOC) NOC
Regulations’’) by reaffirming the rules for listing patents on
the register and clarifying when listed patents must be
addressed.
The Government’s drug patent policy seeks to balance
effective patent enforcement over new and innovative drugs
with the timely market entry of their lower priced generic
competitors. The current manner in which that balance is
realized was established in 1993, with the enactment of Bill
C-91, the Patent Act Amendment Act, 1992, S.C. 1993,
c. 2. 108

This balancing of interests was recently acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada in its Biolyse
decision, in which Justice Bastarache stated that amendments to the NOC Regulations were intended to ‘‘confirm the balance between providing effective enforcement of patent right, while ensuring that second and
subsequent entry manufacturers’ drugs can enter the
market as soon as it is determined that they are not
covered by a patent, or, where they are covered by a
patent, immediately after the patent expiry’’. 109 Similar

language was used by Justice Binnie to the effect that
that ‘‘[i]t seems clear that the NOC Regulations were
introduced to help generic drug companies and at the
same time curb potential patent abuse by them’’. 110
These statements are consistent with those made by Justice Issac of the Federal Court of Appeal writing in dissent in an earlier NOC decision. 111
Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that
the purpose and intent of the NOC Regulations is to
balance competing interests of brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical companies in Canada. By balancing
these interests the government has taken a well circumscribed step to ensure the availability to the public of
access to affordable medication: as stated in the 2004
RIAS, ‘‘[t]he Government’s drug patent policy seeks to
balance effective patent enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely market entry of their lower
priced generic competitors’’. 112
In light of the balancing function of the NOC Regulations, the test for obviousness should be ‘‘fair’’ in that
it should be neither unfairly biased nor inherently
skewed to the interests of one party. However, the current test effects just this result as it allows for no scientific
testing or research whatsoever without obviating a
finding of obviousness, and it does so independent of the
common practice in the art to undertake just such
testing as a matter of course. There is no recourse for
generic firms when the ‘‘no testing’’ approach is applied:
a patentee need only demonstrate some testing was performed in the lead-up to the invention and the court
must find for brand-name firms. The person skilled in
the art, who under the provisions of section 28.3 of the
Act, is to supply the lens through which the judiciary is
to gaze when assessing obviousness, is obliged by law to
operate at the highest level of scientific and technical
sophistication, yet possess not even a scintilla of creativity
or inventiveness when contemplating testing in the obviousness analysis. As discussed elsewhere, 113 this contradicts scientific norms for persons skilled in the art. As
such, the test is intrinsically and irrevocably skewed both
in theory and in practice to pharmaceutical patentees
and thus does not respect a policy of balance. For this
reason, the test articulated in Beloit, Bayer, and progeny
runs afoul of the constitutional requirement for fairness
by contravening the stated purpose of the NOC Regulations.
(c) Summary
In summary, a requirement for fairness, predictability, and certainty in application of the test for obviousness can be located in the Rule of Law, Supreme
Court patent jurisprudence and statements by legislators
regarding the intent and purpose of the NOC Regulations. This requirement is breached in two ways by the
stringent test for obviousness. First, because it yields a
situation where there is a substantial lack of certainty
and predictability as to the correct standard for testing
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within the obviousness rubric. And second, because
courts have adopted reasoning in the obviousness analysis that inherently and thus unfairly biases the legal test
against generic firms under the NOC Regulations.

a particularly important consideration in jurisdictions
such as Canada, where regulatory approval of
pharmaceuticals is controlled by linkage regulations,
which in turn allows for line extension patents that can
be continually evergreened. 121

Part IV: Suggestion for an Unequivocal,
Predictable, and Fair Test

In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada noted
that courts must take a purposive approach not only to
infringement but also to validity, in order to avoid construing claims differently for purposes of infringement
and validity. 122 Similar reasoning applies to differences
between claim construction and obviousness. Finally, as
with claim construction, taking a purposive approach to
obviousness would satisfy the interpretive objective in
patent law of being ‘‘reasonable and fair to both the
patentee and the public’’. 123 As well, it would respect the
public notice function of law. 124

(a) Purposive Construction of Obviousness
As reviewed above, there is a small but growing
number of judges who have moved away from Beloit
and Bayer to allow research or testing in NOC cases
without obviating a finding of obviousness. Judicial reasoning in these cases typically entails articulation of
‘‘due’’, ‘‘rational’’, ‘‘incremental’’, ‘‘routine’’, ‘‘mechanical’’,
or ‘‘workshop’’ testing. In these decisions a finding for or
against generic firms was based on the evidence before
the court, expert opinion, and an appreciation of contextual practices of persons skilled in the art in the pharmaceutical industry. 114 As such, the tests applied by these
courts was objective yet flexible.
A useful starting point for discussion of an unequivocal, predictable, and fair test is by way of analogy to the
issue of claim construction, which according to the
Supreme Court of Canada must be made in a pragmatic
and informed way. 115 In Whirlpool v. Camco, for
example, the court, following the Federal Court of
Appeal in Eli Lilly v. O’Hara 116 and the House of Lords
in Catnic v. Hill & Smith, 117 held that patent claims
should be construed ‘‘purposively’’, whereby emphasis is
placed on locating the essence of an invention with the
aid of persons skilled in the art (rather than interpreting
the words of the inventor literally). Viewing the patent
through a skilled interpreter minimizes, in the words of
Lord Diplock, reliance on the type of literal and ‘‘meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often
tempted by their training to indulge’’. 118
While the courts in Whirlpool and Catnic were
concerned with claim construction rather than
validity, 119 an emphasis on the ‘‘essential nature’’ of the
invention and how it came to be is a constant feature in
both analyses. In the case of claim construction it is
distinguishing between essential and non-essential elements of the claim, whereas in the obviousness analysis it
is the determination of whether the act of arriving at an
invention crosses the line between inventive and noninventive activity. Moreover, both assessments are to be
made contextually, 120 with the help of persons skilled in
the art. The issue of context is no less important to the
issue of obviousness, as no invention least of all those in
the multinational pharmaceutical industry arises in
vacuo. All advances, be they large or small, evolve based
on previous discoveries. To say that obviousness can only
be found in the absence of experimentation, thought, or
research is to deny the manner in which discoveries are
made and reduced to practice, and essentially conflates
the test for obviousness into that for anticipation. This is

Particularly important to the issue at hand is that a
purposive construction is said to achieve ‘‘flexibility and
fairness’’ in law by focusing on the essence or so-called
‘‘pith and marrow’’ of an invention. 125 This broad focus
can be contrasted to the narrow focus on literal notions
of testing versus no testing in the stringent approach to
obviousness (or the would versus could distinction). A
purposive approach would involve an enquiry into the
nature of the research or testing leading up to the invention, the focal point being a determination of whether or
not the testing was inventive. The term ‘‘purposive’’ need
not be used; any term connoting a functional and pragmatic approach aimed at assessing the essence of inventive activity would suffice. No matter what the terminology used, the purposive approach comports well to
the implicit reasoning employed by many of the judges
in decisions where testing was allowed, including those
where the judiciary claimed to follow the stringent standard but actually applied the more flexible one.
A recent case under the NOC Regulations can be
used to illustrate how the central elements of a purposive
construction might be applied to obviousness. BMS v.
Novopharm 126 involved gatifloxacin, a quinolonecarboxylic acid antibiotic. Evidence indicated that research into
quinalones had been intense and extensive among
highly qualified persons skilled in the art for 10 years
prior to the claim date. 127 Justice Gibson approved of
statements by Novopharm’s lead expert that the science
involved in producing the invention (medicinal chemistry) was more predictable than experts for BMS had
claimed. 128 Regarding the issue of testing, the court
noted the prohibition in Beloit against any experiment,
thought, or research involving more than a ‘‘mere scintilla’’ of inventiveness. However, given the evidence
before him as to the inventive capacity of persons skilled
in the art of pharmaceutical science, he rejected the test
in Beloit in favour of the more flexible approach, casting
the definition of persons skilled in the art ‘‘well above
the concept of an individual having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination’’. 129 Referring to the decisions in
Apotex v. Wellcome 130 (AZT), Pfizer v. Apotex 131 (sert-
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raline) and Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm 132 (levofloxacin) discussed supra, he allowed routine testing that fell
below the threshold of undue or inventive testing. This
included testing that produces surprising or unexpected
results. 133 As in Justice Reed’s articulation of allowable
testing in the Apotex v. Hoffmann LaRoche 1 3 4
trimethoprim case, the court noted that what constitutes
‘‘routine testing’’ in the context of obviousness must be
dependant upon evidence adduced before the court.
Based on such evidence Justice Gibson held that the
patent was not obvious, finding specifically that the chief
expert for Novopharm admitted on cross-examination
that the starting point in his analysis was not the prior
art, but rather the invention in question. This led him to
conclude that Novopharm’s expert was engaged in a
classic hindsight analysis. 135
While the claims were ultimately held to be valid,
Justice Gibson’s analysis is consistent with the purposive
approach outlined above. It was grounded in context at
the time of the claim date and evidence adduced before
the court. His decision turned on evidence pertaining to
the degree of activity in the field at the time of invention,
the somewhat predictable nature of the science and
techniques involved in producing the invention, the fact
that some degree of testing is routinely employed in the
pharmaceutical industry, and the fact that persons skilled
in the art are in reality not completely devoid of inventive ingenuity. The latter two observations go to the
heart of purposive construction as they are directed specifically to whether research conducted by BMS was
inventive or not. The fact that evidence showed such
testing was inventive does not detract from taking an
approach that seeks to understand the pith and marrow
of the matter. Rather, it highlights the value of taking a
contextual and evidence-based approach to obviousness
rather than focusing on binary notions of testing/no
testing or would/could. The test is flexible rather than
stringent, and thus is fair to both litigants.
A purposive approach would also reconcile important differences in obviousness jurisprudence in Canada
and the United Kingdom that persist in spite of the
increasingly global nature of drug development and
intellectual property rights attaching to pharmaceutical
inventions. As noted by Justice Lederman in Bayer, a
significant discrepancy exists in the inventive capacity of
English and Canadian persons skilled in the art such that
‘‘making inquiries or testing, seems to be something
outside the ken of the notional Canadian skilled technician’’. 136 Justice Lederman went on to say while it may
have been logical to a person skilled in the art to undertake testing, that it was not open to the mythical skilled
technician who can not have an inquiring mind. Rather,
the law in Canada stands for the proposition that a
skilled technician is expected to spontaneously exclaim
‘‘I already know the answer and it is obvious’’. Reasoning
of this kind led Justice Blanchard in the recent Pfizer v.
Novopharm azithromycin ‘‘food effects’’ case to say that
it can be scientifically obvious to arrive at an invention
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in practice but that this need not be equivalent to legally
obvious, 137 even though this scenario runs against the
grain of analyzing a patented invention contextually 138
through the eyes of a person skilled in the art, 139 with a
mind willing to understand 140 all that is necessary in
order to successfully solve the problem before them 141
enabled by all relevant prior art and best-practices in the
industry at the time of the claim date. 142
The Canadian approach can be contrasted with that
in the United Kingdom not only with regard to obviousness but also anticipation, the latter of which is traditionally a harder ground of invalidity to make out. For
example, in the classic case of Van Der Lely v.
Bramford, 143 the House of Lords held that ordinary
methods of trial and error testing can anticipate an
invention, provided they do not involve an inventive
step. Included in the scope of allowable testing are ordinary methods of trial and error that involve no inventive
step and are generally necessary in applying any discovery to produce a practical result. 144 This contrasts
sharply with the Canadian position on anticipation
articulated by Fox and applied in Beloit and later cases.
The leading United Kingdom case on testing in the
context of obviousness is Lord Mustill’s Court of Appeal
decision in Genentech. 145 The case stands for the proposition that an invention is obvious when analyzed
contextually if it can be determined through well known
testing techniques involving trial and error. The court
made a distinction between a notational skilled technician attempting to put an invention into practice and
persons skilled in the art operating in a ‘‘discovery
capacity’’ in a field where intelligence and problemsolving abilities are both valued and normative. The
court found it appropriate in cases involving complex
biomedical inventions to assume people who are skilled
in the art posses a substantial degree of problem-solving
ability. Indeed, the court held that ‘‘but for’’ the creative
skills of relevant persons skilled in the art they would not
have been included on the discovery team in the first
place. It is these skilled technicians who make up the
population of persons skilled in the art to which the
court must look when assessing obviousness. The reasoning of Lord Mustill on this point parallels that of
Justice Gibson in BMS v. Novopharm, Apotex v. Hoffmann-LaRoche and the AZT trial decision, 146 and is present in varying degrees in all of the cases enumerated in
Table 2 and many of those in Table 3. Another point of
convergence was the court’s holding that the skills of the
person skilled in the art must be construed contextually,
based on evidence brought before the court. 147
Finally, Lord Mustill laid the burden for weighing
considerations of obviousness squarely on the judiciary
notwithstanding the caution to avoid hindsight in the
obviousness analysis. 148 In looking to the essence of the
issue, courts in the United Kingdom are therefore
charged with the burden of determining whether the
problem faced by the inventor ‘‘could have been over-
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come by pertinacity, sound technique, or trial and error,
with no more, or whether there would have been
required a spark of imagination’’ beyond that properly
attributable to persons skilled in the art. It is left to the
judge to form a mental picture of the art and skilled
practitioner, and see how the latter measures up against
the problem which he or she is assumed to be
attempting to solve. Given the pragmatic and functional
approach taken by him it is not surprising that
numerous Canadian tribunals, including the Patent
Appeals Board, 149 the Federal Court of Canada, 150 and
the Supreme Court of Canada, 151 have cited various portions of Lord Mustill’s decision with approval, including
that on obviousness. 152
(b) Comparison with Calls for Law Reform in the
United States
There have been significant calls for reform in the
law of obviousness in the United States. In particular,
patent scholars have observed that the threshold for
obviousness has been increasingly construed by the Federal Circuit as too onerous in light of the actual skills and
knowledge of persons skilled in the relevant art, particularly when compared with that in other research-heavy
sectors such as information technology. The law differs
significantly from that in Canada, however, as courts in
the United States have tended to focus on differences
between the structure and function of biomedical inventions, 153 ignoring strong evidence of functional obviousness in favour of analyzing the prior art in light of the
level of uncertainty relating to the structural aspect of
therapeutic molecules. Canadian courts, by contrast,
tend to take the evidence as they find it in cases under
the NOC Regulations, focusing on structure or function
as alleged by the attacking party in its Notice of Allegation.
The role of persons skilled in the art in the obviousness analysis has recently garnered considerable
attention in the United States. In May 2006 the United
States Supreme Court solicited the opinion of the Solicitor General on whether it should hear KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. et al., 154 a case involving a
combination patent directed to an adjustable gas pedal
for use in throttle control and an electronic control to
communicate adjustments from the adjustable gas pedal
to the engine. KSR, a Canadian corporation, was granted
summary judgment against Teleflex in its infringement
suit. The lower court decision was overturned on appeal
to the Federal Circuit, leading to the petition by KSR.
The case is highly pertinent to the present analysis as it
involves the first substantial determination of the nature
of a court’s proper reliance on persons skilled in the art
when deciding the issue of obviousness by the United
States Supreme Court since Graham v. John Deere. 155
The court granted certiorari June 26, 2006 and heard
oral argument in late November 2006. A decision is
expected in spring 2007.
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The primary ground of appeal in Teleflex is that the
Federal Circuit has retreated significantly from the test
laid down by the Supreme Court in its John Deere decision:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of
law, the condition set forth in the Patent Act of 1952, 35
U.S.C.S. § 103, which is but one of three conditions, each of
which must be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries: (1) the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; (2) differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue are to be ascertained, and (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject
matter is determined. 156

Consequently, determinations of patentability were
made on the basis of a comparison of the essential characteristics of the alleged invention with those present in
the relevant prior art. The court was clear that such
determinations were to be made in light of knowledge
possessed by relevant persons skilled in the art under the
specific auspices of § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section
102 of this title (novelty), if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. 157

Thus, as in Canadian patent law, the lens through
which the judiciary must gaze when determining
whether the invention was a patentable advance over the
relevant prior art was that of the person having ordinary
skill in the art, typically referred to in American legal
commentary as the PHOSITA. However, counsel for
KSR and numerous amicus curiae, including the United
States Solicitor General and Twenty Four Intellectual
Law Professors (‘‘Law Professors’’), claim that the Federal
Circuit has retreated from the John Deere factors,
replacing them instead with a more stringent and inflexible test requiring that a specific ‘‘suggestion, teaching or
motivation’’ to combine the relevant prior art teachings
in the manner claimed must be demonstrated to support
a finding of obviousness. 158 This is analogous to Canadian courts adopting the more stringent test in the context of testing. As noted by one prominent patent
scholar, 159 this has resulted in the gradual marginalization of persons skilled in the art in obviousness cases
generally, leaving room for considerable judicial review
of lower court findings of fact based on a less deferential
standard of review. 160
The requirement to find in evidence such a specific
piece of prior art contravenes the Supreme Court’s direction in John Deere toward applying a ‘‘functional
approach’’ articulated by the court earlier in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood. 161 As noted by Justice Clark in John Deere,
the Hotchkiss formulation, ‘‘lies not in any label, but in
its functional approach to questions of patentability’’. 162
In practice, Hotchkiss has required a comparison
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between the subject matter of the patent, or patent application, and the background skill of the calling. It has
been from this comparison that patentability was in each
case determined. As such, Hotchkiss and the pragmatic
approach advocated in Part IV(a) supra share a basic
focus on the essence of an invention and the manner in
which it came to be. Another point of convergence is
that the law is to be applied in a contextual manner on a
case-by-case basis. As is true of obvious determinations in
Canada and the United Kingdom, 163 the United States
Supreme Court was mindful of the burden on the judiciary in rendering such determinations. However, as in
the United Kingdom (but not Canada) the court was
clear that such difficulties were not unlike those encountered in any other type of case before the courts:
This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious
is not a question upon which there is likely to be uniformity
of thought in every given factual context. The difficulties,
however, are comparable to those encountered daily by the
courts in such frames of reference as negligence and scienter,
and should be amenable to a case-by-case development. We
believe that strict observance of the requirements laid down
here will result in that uniformity and definiteness which
Congress called for in the 1952 Act. 164

Despite the clarity of the decisions in Hotchkiss and
John Deere, it is claimed 165 that the Federal Circuit has
minimized the role of persons skilled in the art in the
obviousness analysis through the assumption, 166 paralleled in Canadian jurisprudence, that such persons are
incapable of innovation and inventiveness, and by
viewing obviousness as a question of law rather than one
of fact. 167 As in Canadian cases where the judiciary recite
law standing for the proposition that no testing is
allowed but then find that the testing undertaken was in
fact non-inventive, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on
obviousness has apparently created a similar type of
double standard in the law by reciting the importance of
persons skilled in the art to the obviousness analysis,
then not depending on the skills or knowledge of such
persons when rendering decisions. 168 As claimed by the
Solicitor General and the Law Professors in their respective briefs, this has resulted in a substantial lowering of
the bar for patentability, with a concomitant diminution
in new discoveries and foreclosure of competitors’ use of
knowledge that would otherwise be in the public
domain. 169 This is reminiscent of the discussion by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Free World Trust of the
effect of an improperly defined patent scope to create an
undue ‘‘commercial risk zone’’ for competitors discussed
supra.
The Federal Circuit has historically justified the relatively inflexible teaching-suggestion approach based on
the effort to avoid hindsight analysis, whereby persons
skilled in the art use the hindsight of prior art disclosed
after the priority date when analyzing the alleged invention at the time of the claim date. Hindsight is a difficult
problem to be sure, and was part of the reason for Justice
Hugessen’s claim in Beloit that the obviousness test ‘‘is

very difficult to satisfy’’. 170 It will be recalled that the
same concern was articulated by Justice Lederman in
Bayer as grounds for the no testing/worth a try approach
and the could /would distinction. As noted by the Solicitor General in its Teleflex brief, however, the strict test
articulated by the Federal Circuit constricts the test laid
down by the Supreme Court in John Deere, which calls
for a flexible approach to obviousness. The Federal Circuit’s test thus ‘‘fails to account for the problem-solving
abilities of persons of ordinary skill in the art’’ and
‘‘underestimates the capabilities of courts and patent
examiners to ‘resist the temptation’ of hindsight and to
consider fairly the question of obviousness’’. 171 As noted
by Justice Clark in John Deere, the ‘‘ultimate question’’
of patent validity rests on the judgment, informed by
relevant facts on a case-by-case basis, of whether a person
of ordinary skill in the art would have found the invention as a whole obvious. 172 This echoes the more flexible
and purposive approach taken by Justice Gibson and
Lord Mustill in their BMS v. Novopharm and Genentech
decisions, respectively.
The test articulated by the Federal Circuit does further violence to the scope of obviousness as it conflates it
into that for anticipation. As noted by the Law Professors,
the obviousness requirement asks of the court to determine not what is already present in the prior art as of the
claim date, but rather whether a person skilled in the art
would deem the subject matter obvious in light of
whatever prior art exists as of the claim date. 173 In contrast, the Federal Circuit’s teaching-suggestion approach
requires the prior art to contain a particularized suggestion, teaching, or motivation to ground a finding of obviousness: if no such specific suggestion, teaching, or motivation is put in evidence, then the invention must be
deemed nonobvious This is clearly contrary to the
United States Supreme Court’s ruling in John Deere,
leading the Solicitor General to recommend that KSR’s
petition for writ of certiorari be granted. It is again reminiscent of arguments made above in the context of Professor Fox’s legal commentary that the stringent standard
for obviousness differs little from that for anticipation
under current Canadian law with regard to testing.
A final important issue arising out of Teleflex is the
distinction between inventive and non-inventive (or
mechanical) testing. In its John Deere decision, the
United States Supreme Court made comments
regarding the role of persons skilled in the art relating to
‘‘routine testing’’ that are pertinent to the analysis of
cases under the NOC Regulations. As noted supra, the
court looked to its previous decision in Hotchkiss to
interpret the proper scope of obviousness following its
codification in the United States Patent Act in 1952. In
Hotchkiss, the court grappled with developing legal
means of facilitating the public disclosure of inventions
that would not otherwise be disclosed or created but for
the inducement of the patent monopoly. The court held:
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Unless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . .
than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted
with the business, there was an absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of
every invention. In other words, the improvement is the
work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor. 174

A patent is therefore granted to an inventor who
goes beyond the level of skill of ‘‘an ordinary mechanic’’.
The reasoning in Hotchkiss, as in Canadian decisions
released somewhat contemporaneously (Lightning Fastener and Burns & Russell) is clearly pragmatic in nature
and aimed at the essential nature of the inventive activity
in each case. It will be recalled that Justice Gibson’s
decision was applied subsequently in the AZT trial decision 175 and in other cases employing the more flexible
standard when terms such as ‘‘mechanical’’, ‘‘routine’’,
and ‘‘incremental’’ testing have been employed. As noted
by the United States Supreme Court in John Deere,
Hotchkiss has had enormous implications for American
patent law. 176
Regarding the issue of who makes the decision as to
whether or not an invention is the work of a skillful
mechanic or an inventor, the court was clear that it was
to be relevant persons skilled in the art. This determination is to be made on a case-by-case basis, giving rise to
the ‘‘functional approach’’ to patentability advocated by
the Solicitor General in its amicus curiae brief. In John
Deere, it was disputed by several parties that the requirement for obviousness under § 103 was specifically
inserted by amendment to the United States Patent Act
in 1952 to overrule previous considerations of what constitutes ‘‘the flash of inventive genius’’, 177 and thus to
specifically lower the bar for obviousness. 178 The court
rejected this claim however, holding that the language in
Cuno referring to inventive genius was nothing other
than ‘‘rhetorical embellishment’’ and did not create a
differing standard. Rather, the court’s previous decision
in Cuno stood for the continuing proposition that nonobvious subject matter is subject matter that extends
‘‘beyond the skill of the calling’’. 179 These are the exact
words of Justice Gibson in Burns & Russell. This concept
was also picked up on by the Solicitor General in its
Teleflex brief, as well as by the Law Professors in their
Teleflex brief. 180 The Law Professors extended this
notion specifically to litigation involving biomedical
technologies. In particular, they claimed that ‘‘methodological advances provided an obvious path to new
results that should not themselves be patentable’’, and
that the Federal Circuit has sufficiently minimized the
role of persons skilled in the art that it routinely applies
the obviousness test such that inventions are deemed to
be nonobvious ‘‘even where the prior art demonstrates a
clear path for producing the invention’’. 181
(c) Summary
A purposeful approach to obviousness is advocated
for cases under the NOC Regulations. The proposed
approach focuses not on binary notions of testing/no

17

testing or would/could, but rather on the essence of
inventive activity from the perspective of skilled persons
in the art casting their mind back to the claim date. That
is, was the experimenting or research that led up to the
invention inventive or not? An approach which focuses
on the essence or pith and marrow of such activity lends
itself well to a legal test for obviousness that satisfies the
constitutional requirement for fairness and predictability.
Moreover, such a test has sufficient flexibility to be
employed in a wide range of factual settings and would
not be inherently biased to brand-name or generic pharmaceutical firms. Finally, a purposive construction would
be in line with English appellate jurisprudence on obviousness, and calls for law reform in the United States.

Part V: Application to Non-NOC Cases
Unlike parallel legislation in the United States, litigation under the NOC Regulations is by way of judicial
review and does not constitute an action for infringement. 182 Judicial review under the NOC Regulations is
considered to be an expedited proceeding and thus summary in nature. It does not entail a full determination of
validity or exploration of evidentiary matters that would
otherwise be before the court in an infringement proceeding. 183 Therefore, formal conclusions on patent
validity cannot be determined in litigation under the
NOC Regulations, notwithstanding that judicial reasoning and pronouncements on the issue of validity may
parallel those in actions under sections 55 (infringement)
or 60 (impeachment) of the Act. The object of litigation
under the NOC Regulations is solely to prohibit the
issuance of a NOC under the Food and Drug Regulations; 184 if a party desires a formal decision on the issue
of invalidity, they must avail themselves of remedies
under the Act. 185 Under this reasoning, applied recently
in a post-NOC infringement action, 186 the law of obviousness would not be applicable to cases outside the
NOC Regulations.
While operation of the NOC Regulations entails
the odd result of a determination of validity which is
only enforced within the ambit of the regulations themselves, it is clear from the common law and the addition
of section 28.3 to the Act in 1996 that determinations of
validity generally are to be made through the lens of
persons skilled in the art in light of all of the relevant
prior art available as of the claim date. In addition, both
hurdles over which generic firms must jump (Fox’s
injunction against testing per se and the ‘‘no scintilla’’
cases) in order to obtain a finding of invalidity, and their,
application to pharmaceutical cases generally, are outside
the rubric of the NOC Regulations. Indeed, the judiciary
have made no attempt to discriminate between the two
streams of case law in rendering decisions under the
NOC Regulations. Finally, jurisprudence and legal scholarship from the United States and the United Kingdom
are outside the scope of the Regulations, yet apply to the
issue at hand through the identity and inventive capacity
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of persons skilled in the art. Thus, there is no reason why
application of arguments made here regarding the role
of scientific testing in the lead-up period to an invention
in the obviousness analysis can not be extended to litigation beyond the NOC Regulations.
A note of caution in this regard is the recent
infringement opinion of Justice Hughes in JanssenOrtho v. Novopharm. 187 In this case it was held that even
though a prior decision under the NOC Regulations
found Novopharm’s allegation that the impugned claims
were invalid on grounds of obviousness was justified, the
same claims were held to be valid and infringed in the
context of subsequent infringement litigation. 188 Justice
Hughes arrived at his decision based on his finding that
an action under the NOC Regulations does not constitute res judicata in subsequent infringement litigation. 189
It remains to be seen whether this decision will withstand appellate scrutiny.

V. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this article was to analyze Canadian
case law on obviousness pertaining to scientific research
and testing leading up to invention under the NOC
Regulations, and to highlight confusion in the courts and
the manner in which the judiciary have attempted to
grapple with the issue of testing in the obviousness analysis. Some decisions were found to stand for the proposition that no experimenting or research whatsoever is
allowed, while other cases stand for the opposite proposition that significant testing does not vitiate the obviousness attack, while still others purport to use the
former standard while actually applying the latter. Thus,
there is significant confusion in Canadian case law on
obviousness under the NOC Regulations.
An analysis of the historical cases cited by Professor
Fox in his injunction against experimentation, thought,
or research in the lead-up to invention does not support
the ‘‘no testing’’ approach to obviousness. Indeed, analysis of this body of case law, along with decisions
released contemporaneously but not cited by Fox, reveal
that in fact extensive testing is routinely undertaken by
persons skilled in the art of pharmaceutical research, and
that courts had allowed such testing without vitiating a
finding of obviousness. This discrepancy was demonstrated clearly by evidence adduced in an early SherwinWilliams 190 chemical case, as well as in later cases
involving pharmaceuticals both outside of and under the
umbrella of the NOC Regulations.
A lack of clear and definitive guidance by the courts
has resulted in considerable arbitrariness, uncertainty,
and a lack of predictability in the case law. It was argued
that this runs afoul of the direction of the Supreme
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Court of Canada that patent law should lend a degree of
certainty and predictability to potential litigants and provide them with fair notice of when they can reasonably
expect to infringe the intellectual property rights of
others. Moreover, courts have adopted reasoning in the
obviousness analysis that inherently, and thus unfairly,
biases the legal test in favour of patentees. The result is
that generic pharmaceutical firms often lose cases
improperly on the issue of obviousness, in turn maintaining dominant market positions for brand-name firms
and monopolistic pricing on products that have often
come off patent on the original new chemical entity. As
such, it was argued the current test creates an improperly
expanded ‘‘risk zone’’ for both the public and generic
firms.
In addition, setting the threshold for scientific
testing to a de minimus level has the effect of placing an
unfair evidentiary burden on generic pharmaceutical
companies to prove invalidity within the context of a
regulatory system that the Supreme Court of Canada has
often referred to as ‘‘Draconian’’. 191 This burden is
onerous under conditions where the legal test departs
from the policy objective underpinning the NOC Regulations to balance the interests of brand-name and
generic pharmaceutical companies. Indeed, both government policy documents and Supreme Court of Canada
jurisprudence clearly indicate concern for balancing the
interests of both parties under the NOC Regulations.
The same concerns have been expressed in the United
States, which, ironically, given its strong innovation
agenda and pharmaceutical presence has undertaken significant reforms to its linkage regime in order to facilitate
precisely such a balance. It is submitted that the lack of a
clear, consistent, and appropriate test for obviousness
represents a departure from maintaining an appropriate
balance between the various private and public actors
involved in the commercialization, regulation, and consumption of pharmaceutical products in Canada.
Finally, a suggestion was made toward a fair, unequivocal, and predictable test which has its locus in
Canadian law, federal policy underlying the NOC Regulations, and Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in
its leading patent decisions. The proposed ‘‘purposive
construction’’ of obviousness focuses contextually on
whether or not experimentation or research conducted
in the lead-up to invention was inventive, rather than
focusing on binary notions of testing/no testing or
could/would. It provides a test that is fair and flexible for
all parties to litigation, is wholly consistent with appellate
jurisprudence, and which calls for law reform in other
jurisdictions with similar patent legislation and policy.
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VI. Appendix 1
Table 1. Summary of cases supporting the ‘‘no testing’’ approach to obviousness
Case, Judge

NOC Cases Precedent(s) Cited, Notes

Non-NOC Cases Precedent(s) Cited, Notes

A. Trace to Fox
Abbott v. Canada†
2006 FC 69
Campbell J.

No Testing: Procter & Gamble v. Canada
(2004), 32 C.P.R . (4th) 224 at para. 36
(F.C.T.D.); Procter & Gamble Inc. v. Canada
(2004), 37 C.P.R . (4th) 289 at paras. 43–47
(C. A .); A B Hassle v. Genpharm Inc., (2003) F.C. J.
No. 1910 (QL). Claims valid — MOH prohibited
from issuing NOC (clar ithromycin).

Pf izer v. Canada
2005 FC 1205
Heneghan J.

No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL). Claims not obvious.
Patent invalid on other grounds. (quinapr il)

Pf izer v. Novopharm
2005 FC 1299
Blanchard J.

No Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome,
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382. Claims valid — MOH
prohibited from issuing NOC (azithromycin)

Sanof i-Synthalebo v. Apotex
2005 FC 390
Shore J.

No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL); Cabot Cor p. v. 318062
Ont. Ltd (1988), 20 C.P.R . (3d) 132; Farbwerke
Hoescht Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon
(Ontar io) Ltd. (1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.);
Harold Fox, Canadian Law and Practice
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 4th ed.
( Toronto: Carswell, 1969). Claims valid — MOH
prohibited from issuing NOC (clopidogrel)

Procter & Gamble v. Canada
2004 FC 204
Snider J.

No Testing: Smithkline Beecham v. Apotex,
2001 FC T 770; Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J.
No. 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.). Claims valid
— MOH prohibited from issuing NOC.
(etidronate)

A B Hassle v. Genpharm
2003 FC 1443
Layden-Stevenson J.

No Testing: Pf izer v. Apotex, 2002 FC T 1138;
Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) (QL); Cabot Cor p. v. 318062 Ont. Ltd.
(1988), 20 C.P.R . (3d) 132; Harold Fox,
Canadian Law and Practice Relating to Letters
Patent for Inventions, 4th ed. ( Toronto: Carswell,
1969). Claims valid — MOH prohibited from
issuing NOC. (omeprazole)

671905 Alberta v. Q’Max Solutions
2003 FCA 241
Stone J. A .

No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL). Note: FCA said f irst that
no patent ensues where mechanical testing is
involved, citing Lightning Fastener v. Colonial
Fastener, [1933] S.C.R . 371and FCA decision in
Apotex v. Wellcome, [2000] 10 C.P.R . (4th) 65.
However, tr ial judge was guided by the decision
in Bayer, that expert evidence was adduced at
tr ial that the inventions were not obvious, and
that appeal courts should not inter fere in the
absence of a palpable and over-r iding error,
citing FCA decisions in Apotex v. Wellcome,
(2000) 10 CPR (4th) 65 and Creations v.
Canper Industr ial Products, (1990) 34 CPR (3d)
178. Claims valid and infr inged. Appeal
dismissed. (dr illing machine)

Baker PetroLite v. Canwell
2001 FC T 889
Gibson J.

No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141,
60 C.P.R . (3d) 58 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Cabot Cor p.
v. 318062 Ont. Ltd [1988], 20 C.P.R . (3d) 132;
Harold Fox, Canadian Law and Practice
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 4th ed.
( Toronto: Carswell, 1969). Claims valid and
infr inged. Appeal dismissed 2002 FC 3 (FCA ).
(hydrocarbon sweetening process)
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2001 FC T 770
Gibson J.
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No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141,
60 C.P.R . (3d) 58 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Takach
1993; Cabot Cor p. v. 318062 Ont. Ltd. (1988),
20 C.P.R . (3d) 132; Harold Fox, Canadian Law
and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for
Inventions, 4th ed. ( Toronto: Carswell, 1969).
Claims valid. Application dismissed on other
grounds — anticipation. (paroxetine)

Apotex v. Wellcome
[1998] FCJ No. 382 (QL)
Wetston J.

No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL); Takach 1993; Farbwerke
Hoescht Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon
(Ontar io) Ltd. (1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.);
Harold Fox, Canadian Law and Practice
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 4th ed.
( Toronto: Carswell, 1969). Claims (in part) valid
and infr inged. Action for declaration of
invalidit y dismissed. Upheld on appeal [2001] 1
F.C. 495 (F.C. A .), aff ’d (2002) 4 S.C.R . 153.
(A ZT )

Bayer v. Apotex
[1995] O. J. No. 141 (QL)
Lederman J.

No Testing: Cabot Cor p. v. 318062 Ont. Ltd.
(1988), 20 C.P.R . (3d) 132; Harold Fox,
Canadian Law and Practice Relating to Letters
Patent for Inventions, 4th ed. ( Toronto: Carswell,
1969); Diversif ied Products Cor p. v. Tye-Sil
Cor p. (1991), 35 C.P.R . (3d) 350 (F.C. A .); Beloit
Canada Ltd. v. Valmet OY (1986), 8 C.P.R . (3d)
289 (F.C. A .); Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontario) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.). Breach of
compulsor y license. Upheld on appeal: aff irmed
[2002] O. J. No. 193 (O.C. A .), appeal dismissed
[1998[ S.C.C. A . No. 563 (S.C.C.).

Farbwerke v. Halocarbon
(1979) 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.)
Pigeon J.

No Testing: Same 2 cases, along with Majorit y
opinion by Pigeon, also include ‘‘testing and
development’’ processes, citing: Pope Appliance
Cor p. v. Spanish River Pulp and Paper Mills,
[1929] 1 D.L .R . 209; CGE Co. v. Fada Radio,
[1930] 1 D.L .R . 449. Note: Signif icant minorit y
(3 of 7) disagreed, saying invention was more or
less ver if ication

B. Trace to No Scintilla
Pf izer v. Canada
2005 FC 1205
Heneghan J.

No Scintilla: Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.).

Pf izer v. Canada
2005 FC 1421
Mosley J.

No Scintilla: Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.)

Aventis v. Apotex
2005 FC 1504
Tremblay-Lamer J.

No Scintilla: Diversif ied Products Cor p. v. TyeSil Cor p. (1991), 35 C.P.R . (3d) 350 (F.C. A .).

Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm
2004 FC 1631
Mosley J.

No Scintilla: Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.).

Procter & Gamble v. Canada
2004 FC 204
Snider J.

No Scintilla: Diversif ied Products Cor p. v. TyeSil Cor p. (1991), 35 C.P.R . (3d) 350 (F.C. A .);
Farbwerke Hoescht Ak tiengesellschaft v.
Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd. (1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d)
145 (S.C.C.).

A B Hassle v. Genpharm
2003 FC 1443
Layden-Stevenson J.

No Scintilla: Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.)

Pf izer v. Apotex
(2002) 22 C.P.R . (4th) 466
(F.C.C.)
Dawson J.

No Scintilla: Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.)

Diversif ied Products v. Tye-Sil
(1991) 35 C.P.R . (3d) 350 (F.C. A .)
Decar y J.

No Scintilla: Samuel Parkes v. Cocker Bros.,
[1929] 46 R .P.C. 241; Canada v. Uhlemann
Optical, [1952] 1 S.C.R . 143
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Farbwerke v. Halocarbon†
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145
(S.C.C.) Pigeon J.

No Scintilla: Pope Appliance Cor p. v. Spanish
River Pulp and Paper Mills, [1929] 1 D.L .R . 209;
CGE Co. v. Fada Radio, [1930] 1 D.L .R . 449.

Scragg v. Leesona†
[1964] Ex. C.R . 649
Thorson J.

No Scintilla: Samuel Parkes v. Cocker Bros.,
[1929] 46 R .P.C. 241; Non-Dr ip Measure v.
Strangers, [1943] 60 R .P.C. 135; Cleveland
Graphite v. Glacier Metal [1950] 67 R .P.C. 149;
Martin and Br io Swan v. Millwood, [1956]
R .P.C. 125

†Deals directly with the issue of testing
Table 2. Summary of cases supporting some degree of testing in the obviousness analysis
Case, Judge

NOC Cases Precedent(s) Cited, Notes

Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm†
2006 FC 1234
Hughes J.

Non-NOC Cases Precedent(s) Cited, Notes
Yes Testing. Factors (pr imar y and secondar y)
laid out in a new test. Grafts W hirlpool Cor p. v.
Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R . 1067 (diligent in
keeping up) onto Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet
OY (1986), 8 C.P.R . (3d) 289 (F.C. A .). Explicitly
rejects such terms as ‘‘worth a tr y’’ and ‘‘routine
testing’’. The length of time and expenses are
irrelevant. Inventive effort is at the core.
Stipulates that tests are different under NOC
Regs and infr ingement — ‘‘justif ication’’ has a
different standard. Acknowledges, that court
must weigh all factors and make a decision.
Based on evidence, impugned claim is valid and
infr inged. (levof loxacin)

BMS v. Novopharm†
2005 FC 1458
Gibson J.

Yes Testing: Pf izer v. Apotex, 2002 FC T 1138;
Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm, 2004 FC 1631;
Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome, [1998] F.C. J.
No. 382. Note: Based on evidence, f inds for
Applicant. Claims valid — MOH prohibited
from issuing NOC. (gatif loxacin)

Aventis Pharma v. Apotex
2005 FC 1504
Tremblay-Lamer J.

Yes Testing: Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm, 2004
FC 1631; Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome, [1998]
F.C. J. No. 382. Claims invalid — Application
dismissed. (ramipr il)

Pf izer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.
2005 FC 1421
Mosley J.

Yes Testing: Statement (at 131) favour ing
routine exper imentation as long as it is not
undue testing. Claims invalid — Application
dismissed. (azithromycin)

Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm
2004 FC 1631
Mosley J.

Yes Testing: Pf izer v. Apotex, 2002 FC T 1138;
Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome, [1998] F.C. J.
No. 382. Claims invalid — Application
dismissed. (levof loxacin)

Glaxosmithkline v. Canada
2003 FC 899
Noël J.

Yes Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome,
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382. Claims invalid —
Application dismissed. (car vedilol)

Glaxosmithkline v. Canada
2004 FC 116
Noël J.
Pf izer v. Apotex
(2002) 22 C.P.R . (4th) 466
(F.C.C.)
Dawson J.

Yes Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome,
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382. Note: court also said that
a PSA is a paragon of deduction and dexter it y
(Beloit) and also reasonably diligent in keeping
up with advances in the f ield: W hirlpool Cor p.
v. Camco [2000] 2 S.C.R . 1067 at para. 74
Claims invalid — Application dismissed.
(sertaline)

Novartis v. Apotex
2001 FC T 1129
Blais J.

Yes Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome,
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382, but mainly Genentech
Inc.’s Patent, [1989] R .P.C. 147 (C. A .) and an
article by John Bochnovic in 1994. Claims
invalid — Application dismissed. (cyclospor in)
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Apotex v. Hof fmann-La Roche
(1987) 15 C.P.R . (3d) 217
Reed J.

Yes Testing: Testing was not inventive. It was
routine: Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet OY (1986),
8 C.P.R . (3d) 289 (F.C. A .); Windsur f ing
Inter national Inc. v. Tr ilantic Cor p., (1985) 8
C.P.R . (3d) 241 (F.C. A .). Application for
declaration patent was invalid allowed.
(sulphonamide tr imethopr im)

Burns & Russell Canada v. Day
(1965) 48 C.P.R . 207 (Ex. Ct.)
Gibson J.

Yes Testing: Testing is allowable provided it is
not ‘‘beyond the expected skill of the calling’’ or
‘‘beyond the skill of the routineer’’. Sees as
extension of Cr ipps question. Infr ingement
action dismissed and counterclaim for invalidit y
allowed. (masonr y-coating)

Canadian Industries v. Sher winWilliams
(1964) Ex. C.R . 65
Angers J.

Yes Testing: Mechanical testing by skilled
work shop worker is not inventive. (resinous
condensation products)

Lightning Fastener v. Colonial
Fastener
[1933] S.C.R . 371
Rinfret J.

Yes Testing: Exercise of mechanical skill does
not equate with exercise of inventive facult y and
does not deser ve a patent monopoly: Durable
Electr ic Appliance v. Renfrew Electr ic Products,
[1928] S.C.R . 8; Atlantic Work s v. Brady, 107
U.S. 192 (2002). Appeal of action for
infr ingement dismissed. (slide fasteners)

Pope Appliance v. Spanish River Pulp
and Paper
[1927] Ex. C.R . 29
Maclean P.

Yes Testing: The exercise of mechanical skill,
including exper imenting , does not amount to a
patentable invention where such exper iments
are not inventive.

†Deals directly with the issue of testing
Table 3. Summary of cases purporting to apply the stringent standard but actually applying the flexible
test for obviousness
Case, Judge

NOC Cases Precedent(s) Cited, Notes

I. Testing Allowed
Aventis v. Apotex
2005 FC 1504
Tremblay-Lamer J.

Yes Testing: Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm, 2004
FC 1631; Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome, [1998]
F.C. J. No. 382. No Testing: Sanof i-Synthalebo v.
Apotex, 2005 FC 390; Diversif ied Products
Cor p. v. Tye-Sil Cor p. (1991), 35 C.P.R . (3d) 350
(F.C. A .). Claims invalid — Application
dismissed. (ramipr il)

Pf izer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.
2005 FC 1421
Mosley J

Yes Testing: Statement (at 131) favour ing
routine exper imentation as long as not undue
testing. No Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v.
Wellcome, [1998] F.C. J. No. 382; Bayer 1995;
Farbwerke Hoescht Ak tiengesellschaft v.
Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd. (1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d)
145 (S.C.C.); Harold Fox, Canadian Law and
Practice Relating to Letters Patent for
Inventions, 4th ed. ( Toronto: Carswell, 1969).
Claims invalid — Application dismissed.
(azithromycin)

Janssen-Ortho v. Novopharm
2004 FC 1631
Mosley J.

Yes Testing: Pf izer v. Apotex, 2002 FC T 1138;
Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome, [1998] F.C. J.
No. 382. No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J.
No. 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL); Farbwerke
Hoescht Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon
(Ontar io) Ltd. (1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.).
Claims invalid — Application dismissed.
(levof loxacin)

Non-NOC Cases Precedent(s) Cited, Notes
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Glaxosmithkline v. Canada
2003 FC 899
Noël J.
GlaxoSmithK line v. Canada
2004 FC 116 (FCC)
Noël J.

Yes Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome,
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382. No Testing: Bayer v.
Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
(QL); Cabot Cor p. v. 318062 Ont. Ltd (1988),
20 C.P.R . (3d) 132; Takach 1993; Harold Fox,
Canadian Law and Practice Relating to Letters
Patent for Inventions, 4th ed. ( Toronto: Carswell,
1969). Claims invalid — Application dismissed.
(car vedilol)

Pf izer v. Apotex
(2002) 22 C.P.R . (4th) 466
Dawson J.

Yes Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome,
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382. No Testing: Bayer v.
Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
(QL); Cabot Cor p. v. 318062 Ont. Ltd (1988), 20
C.P.R . (3d) 132; Harold Fox, Canadian Law and
Practice Relating to Letters Patent for
Inventions, 4th ed. ( Toronto: Carswell, 1969);
Diversif ied Products Cor p. v. Tye-Sil Cor p.
(1991), 35 C.P.R . (3d) 350 (F.C. A .); Beloit
Canada Ltd. v. Valmet OY (1986), 8 C.P.R . (3d)
289 (F.C. A .); Farbwerke Hoescht
Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon (Ontar io) Ltd.
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.). Claims
invalid — Application dismissed. (sertraline)

Novartis v. Apotex
2001 FC T 1129
Blais J.

Yes Testing: Apotex/Novopharm v. Wellcome,
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382; Genentech Inc.’s Patent,
[1989] R .P.C. 147 (C. A .); Bochnovic 1994
article. No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J.
No. 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL); Cabot Cor p. v.
318062 Ont. Ltd (1988), 20 C.P.R . (3d) 132;
Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet OY (1986), 8 C.P.R .
(3d) 289 (F.C. A .); Harold Fox, Canadian Law
and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for
Inventions, 4th ed. ( Toronto: Carswell, 1969).
Claims invalid — Application dismissed.
(cyclospor in)
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I. No Testing Allowed
Smithkline Beecham v. Apotex
2001 FC T 770
Gibson J.

No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL); Takach 1993; Cabot
Cor p. v. 318062 Ont. Ltd (1988), 20 C.P.R . (3d)
132; Harold Fox, Canadian Law and Practice
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 4th ed.
( Toronto: Carswell, 1969). Yes Testing: Can tur n
to a logical f irst step, including testing , and still
not have inventive testing. Note: This analysis
was for anticipation. Obviousness failed on
same grounds. Claims valid — Application
dismissed on other grounds (anticipation).

Apotex v. Wellcome
[1998] F.C. J. No. 382
Wetston J.

No Testing: Bayer v. Apotex, [1995] O. J. No. 141
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL); Takach 1993; Farbwerke
Hoescht Ak tiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon
(Ontar io) Ltd. (1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.);
Harold Fox, Canadian Law and Practice
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 4th ed.
( Toronto: Carswell, 1969). Yes Testing: Burns &
Russell v. Day, [1967] 48 C.P.R . 207 (Ex. Ct.);
Genentech Inc.’s Patent, [1989] R .P.C. 147 (C. A .);
Leithiser et al. v. Pengo Hydra-Pull of Canada
Ltd. (1974), 17 C.P.R . (2d) 110 (F.C. A .). Claims
(in part) valid and infr inged. Action for
declaration of invalidit y dismissed. Upheld on
appeal [2001] 1 F.C. 495 (F.C. A .); [2002] 4
S.C.R . 153. (A ZT )

Notes:
1

Gunar K. Gaikis, ‘‘Pharmaceutical patents in Canada. An update on
compulsory licensing ’’ (1992) 42 Patent World 19; Ed Hore, ‘‘ A
comparison of US and Canadian laws as they affect generic
pharmaceutical drug entry’’ (1992) 55 Food & Drug L.J. 373; Donald G.
McFetridge, ‘‘Intellectual property rights and the location of innovative
activity: The Canadian experience with compulsory licensing of patented
pharmaceuticals’’ (Working Paper for the NBER Summer Institute, 1997
(unpublished)).

2

S.O.R./93-133.

3

Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 USC § 355 (2000)),
commonly known as Hatch-Waxman. For an analysis of linkage
regulations in the context of patent law generally, see Rebecca Eisenberg.
‘‘The shifting functional balance of patents and drug regulation.’’ (2001)
20 Health Affairs 119.

24
4
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United States Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to
Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (July 2002), online: Federal Trade
Commission <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf>;
Andrew A. Caffrey & Jonathan M. Rotter, ‘‘Consumer protection, patents
and procedure: Generic drug market entry and the need to reform HatchWaxman’’ (2004) 9 Virg. J.L. & Tech. 1.

5

Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 28.3. See infra note 8 for text.

6

Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet OY (1986), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289 at 294 (F.C.A.)
[Beloit]; Crosley Radio Corp. v. Canadian General Electric Co., [1936]
S.C.R. 551 at 555-556 [Crosley]; Beecham Canada Ltd. et al. v. Procter &
Gamble Co. (1982), 61 C.P.R. (2d) 1 at 27 (F.C.A.) [Beecham]; Samuel
Parkes & Co. Ltd. v. Crocker Bros. Ltd. (1929), 46 R.P.C. 248 at 248.
[Samuel Parkes]; Martinray Industries v. Les Fabricants National Dagendor
(1991), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 1 at 30 (F.C.T.D.); Canadian Gypsum Co. Ltd. v.
Gypsum, Lime & Alabastine Canada Ltd., [1931] Ex. C.R. 180 at 187.

7

Supra note 6. See also, Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Apotex Inc., [1995] O.J.
No. 141, 60 C.P.R. (3d) 58 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (QL) [Bayer cited to QL], aff’d
(2002) 16 C.P.R. (4th) 417, (2002) O.J. No. 193 (O.C.A.) (QL), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 563 (QL).

8

2005 FC 1458 at paras. 70–74 [BMS v. Novopharm].

9

Supra note 5. Section 28.3 of the Act provides that
The subject-matter defined by a claim in an application for a
patent in Canada must be subject-matter that would not have
been obvious on the claim date to a person skilled in the art or
science to which it pertains, having regard to:
(a) information disclosed more than one year before the filing date
by the applicant, or by a person who obtained knowledge, directly
or indirectly, from the applicant in such a manner that the
information became available to the public in Canada or
elsewhere; and
(b) information disclosed before the claim date by a person not
mentioned in paragraph (a) in such a manner that the information
became available to the public in Canada or elsewhere.

10

Applications before 1989 continue to be subject to the common law
requirement for obviousness.

11

Canamould Extrusions Ltd. v. Driangle Inc., 2003 FCT 224 at para. 61.

12

Roger T. Hughes & John H. Woodley, Hughes and Woodley on Patents,
looseleaf (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at § 12.

13

Beloit, supra note 6 at 294-295.

14

According to Quicklaw, in the 20 years since it was released, Beloit has
been mentioned in 87, followed in 17, and explained in 8 cases (June 28,
2006). Beloit was recently upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Procter & Gamble Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of
Health), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1973 at para. 45 (QL) where in response to
argument from counsel for Genpharm that the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067
[Whirlpool] and the Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [1998]
F.C.J. No. 382, 79 C.P.R. (3d) 193 (QL) [Apotex v.Wellcome] AZT case
lowered the standard for obviousness, Justice Rothstein stated he saw
‘‘nothing in Whirlpool that would make the test for obviousness less
difficult to satisfy than that expressed in Beloit.’’

15

SmithKline Beecham Pharma Inc. v. Apotex, 2001 FCT 770 [SmithKline
Beecham].

16

See data in Table 1.

17

Harold Fox, Canadian Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for
Inventions, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1969) at 70-71.

18

A search of Quicklaw (May 14, 2006) using key terms from the passage
on obviousness turns up 570 hits mentioning Fox and 86 decisions
quoting the above passage verbatim.

19

Diversified Products Corp. v. Tye-Sil Corp. (1991), 35 C.P.R. (3d) 350
(F.C.A.) [Diversified]; Farbwerke Hoescht Aktiengesellschaft v. Halocarbon
(Ontario) Ltd. (1979), 42 C.P.R. (2d) 145 (S.C.C.) [Farbwerke]; Ernest
Scragg & Sons Ltd. v. Leesona Corp., [1964] Ex. C.R. 649 (QL) [Ernest
Scragg] and references therein.

20

Beloit, supra note 6 at 294.

21

Supra note 7.

22

Bayer, supra note 7 at para. 56–59.

23

(1988), 20 C.P.R. (3d) 132 at 146 [Cabot Corp.].

24

Bayer, supra note 7 at para. 73.

25

Bayer, supra note 7 at paras. 61, 66. See also Cabot Corp., supra note 23;
Fox, supra note 17; Diversified, supra note 19; Beloit, supra note 6;
Farbwerke, supra note 19.

26

Diversified, supra note 19; Farbwerke, supra note 19; Ernest Scragg, supra
note 19 and references therein.

27

See e.g., Samuel Parkes, supra note 6 at 248; affirmed by Lord Russell of
Killowen in Non-Drip Measure Corp. Ltd. v. Strangers Ltd. et. al. (1943),
60 R.P.C. 135 at 143, Lord Normand in Cleveland Graphite Bronze Corp.
et al. v. Glacier Metal Corp. Ltd. (1950), 67 R.P.C. 149 at 156, and by Lord
Morton of Henryton in Martin and Biro Swan Ld. v. H. Millwood Ltd.
(1956), R.P.C. 125 at 139.

28

Pope Appliance Corp. v. Spanish River Pulp & Paper Mills, [1929] 1 D.L.R.
209 (P.C.) [Pope Appliance P.C.]; CGE Co.Ltd. v. Fada Radio, [1930] 1
D.L.R. 449 (P.C.); Lightning Fastener v. Colonial Fastener, [1933] S.C.R.
371 [Lightning Fastener]; Ernest Scragg, supra note 19; Burns & Russell v.
Day & Campbell, [1967] 48 C.P.R. 207 (Ex. Ct.); Farbwerke, supra note 19.

29

Bayer, supra note 7 at para. 59: ‘‘Thus, Apotex’s position is that the
invention of ’582 was the product of mere workshop analysis, i.e. you try
one thing and if not successful you try a few other well known tests to
deal with the problem to arrive at the composition of an effective dosage
form’’. [Emphasis added]

30

Bayer, supra note 7, at paras. 66-67.

31

Beecham, supra note 6 at 27.

32

Ibid.

33

Justice Lederman’s decision (on the point of obviousness) was upheld on
appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada denied, see details at Bayer, supra note 7. A recent review of
Quicklaw (May 14 2006) indicates that this decision has been followed in
1, explained in 2, and mentioned in 24 cases.

34

Supra note 19.

35

The Cripps Question is: ‘‘The real question is: was it for all practical
purposes obvious to any skilled chemist in the state of chemical
knowledge existing at the date of the patent . . . that he could
manufacture valuable therapeutic agents by making the high alkyl
resorcinols’’: Sharp and Dohme Inc. v. Boots Pure Drug Co. Ltd., (1928)
45 R.P.C. 153 at 173. Note that the question uses ‘‘could’’ and not
‘‘would’’.

36

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Anchor Books, 1967);
David A. Wolfe, Charles Davis & Matthew Lucas, ‘‘Global Networks and
Local Linkages: An Introduction’’ in David A. Wolfe & Matthew Lucas,
eds., Global Networks and Local Linkages: The Paradox of Cluster
Development in an Open Economy (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2005) 1.

37

Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2003 FC 1428 at para. 30[ Pfizer v.
Apotex 2003].

38

Boatman J.A. and Johnson J.B. ‘‘A four-stage approach to new-drug
development. ’’ Pharm. Techn. 5(1), Jan. 1981; Berge S.M. et al .
‘‘Pharmaceutical Salts.’’ J. Pharm. Sci. 66(1) 1–19, 1977; Fung H.L.
‘‘Chemical kinetics and drug stability.’’ In Modern Pharmaceutics. Ed.
Banker G.S. and Rhodes C.T. 1979; Gould P.L. ‘‘Salt selection for basic
drugs.’’ Int. J. Pharm. 33: 201–217, 1986; Greene D.S. ‘‘Preformulation’’. In
Modern Pharmaceutics. Ed. Banker G.S. and Rhodes C.T. 1979; Wadke
D.A., and Jacobson H. ‘‘Preformulation Testing’’. In Pharmaceutical
Dosage Forms: Tablets. Ed. Lieberman H.A., and Lachman L. 1980.

39

Wolfe et al., supra note 36 at 8-9.

40

According to Wolfe ‘‘synthetic knowledge’’ is knowledge directed to
finding technical solutions to specific problems and is particularly
important for product development. Synthetic knowledge is informed by
both tacit ‘‘knowing’’ and applied knowledge. ‘‘Analytical knowledge’’
refers to the intellectual skills underpinning analyzing and synthesizing
information, e.g., constructing rational and/or cognitive models. For
Wolfe, analytical knowledge depends primarily on focal rather than tacit
knowledge.

41

Ron A. Bouchard, ‘‘Living Separate and Apart Is Never Easy: Inventive
Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie that Binds Obviousness and
Inventiveness’’ U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. (forthcoming 2007); see also, Ron.
A. Bouchard, What is the Right Approach to Obviousness in Patent
Litigation under Canada’s Pharmaceutical Linkage NOC Regulations: To
Test or Not To Test? (L.L.M. Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of
Law, 2006) (unpublished).

42

(1987), 15 C.P.R. (3d) 217 [Hoffmann-La Roche].

Should Scientific Research in the Lead-up to Invention Vitiate Obviousness under the Patented Medicines (NOC) Regulations?

25

43

Ibid. at 224-25.

80

[1941] Ex. C.R. 69 (QL) [Short Milling].

44

Ibid. at 232.

81

Ibid. at para. 21.

45

Ductmate Industries Inc. v. Exanno Products Ltd. (1984), 2 C.P.R. (3d) 289
at 307.

82

46

Burns & Russell, supra note 28. See also, Lightning Fastener, supra note
28; Pope Appliance Corp. v. Spanish River Pulp and Paper Mills, [1927]
Ex. C.R. 28 [Pope Appliance]; and infra for a discussion of the phrase
‘‘beyond the expected skill of the calling’’ in United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence relating to obviousness and persons skilled in the art.

Merco Nordstrom Valve Company & Peacock Brothers Ltd. v. Comer,
[1942] Ex. C.R. 138; Thermionics Ltd. v. Philco Products Ltd., [1941] Ex.
C.R. 209.

83

[1977] F.C.J. No. 603 at paras. 74, 75 (QL).

84

Supra note 17 and accompanying text.

85

Supra note 35 at 173.

47

Apotex v. Wellcome, supra note 14 at para. 243.

86

48

The ‘‘pink hue’’ problem refers to the situation whereby tablets of
paroxetine turn pink on exposure to oxygen.

87

Supra note 6.

49

Supra note 15 at para. 40.

88

Sherwin-Williams, supra note 86 at para. 51.

50

2004 FC 1631 [Janssen-Ortho 2004].

89

Sherwin-Williams, supra note 86 at paras. 45-46.

51

Ibid. at paras. 54, 65, 69, 71, 82.

90

52

Apotex v. Wellcome, supra note 14 at para. 243.

53

Ibid.

Burns & Russell, supra note 28. See also discussion of same regarding:
United States Supreme Court obviousness jurisprudence at pp. 40-41,
infra.

54

91

Burns & Russell, supra note 28 at para 62.

Apotex v. Wellcome, supra note 14 at para. 243.

55

Apotex v. Wellcome, supra note 14 at para. 264.

92

Lightning Fastener, supra note 28.

93

Pope Appliance, supra note 46.

94

Ernest Scragg, supra note 19 at para. 190; Samuel Parkes, supra note 6 at
248.

95

Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1123 at 1152.

96

R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 at para. 43
[Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical].

56

Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2002 FCT 1138 at para. 113 [Pfizer v.
Apotex 2002].

57

Ibid. at para. 117.

58

2003 FC 1443.

Canadian Industries Ltd. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. of Canada, [1946] Ex.
C.R. 65 (QL) [Sherwin- Williams].

59

Ibid. at para. 51.

60

Ibid. at paras. 50, 71-72.

61

AB Hassle v. Apotex Inc., 2003 FCT 771.

97

62

Free World Trust v. Electro Sante Inc., 2000 SCC 66 [Free World Trust].

2001 FCT 1129 [Novartis].

98

63

Ibid. at paras. 41, 43.

Ibid. at paras. 117-118.

99

64

Ibid. at paras. 150, 154, 159.

Ibid. at para. 42.

100

65

Ibid. at paras. 137-138.

66

Ibid. at paras. 139–143.

67

GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2003 FC 899
[GlaxoSmithKline].

68

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘‘Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and
Development’’ (2003) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 477; Hee Hong, Marvin D.
Shepherd, David Scoones, & Thomas T.H. Wan Hong. ‘‘Product-line
extensions and pricing strategies of brand-name drugs facing patent
expiration’’. 11(9) Journal of Managed Care & Pharmacy 746 (2005).

Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2005 FC 1421 [Pfizer v. Apotex 2005].

101

69

Ibid. at para. 103.

70

Ibid. at para. 131.

Anita Varma & David Abraham, ‘‘DNA is Different: Legal Obviousness
and the Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market’’ (1996)
9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 53 at 55.

71

GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 67 at para. 44.

102

72

GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 67 at para. 46.

AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2006 SCC 49 at
para. 39 [AstraZeneca].

73

103

Bouchard, supra note 41.

74

I recently tried to purchase a used copy of Fox’s 1969 textbook through
several well-known used books sites (March 2006). There was not one
single copy available anywhere in the world.

75

Fox, supra note 17 at 70-71.

76

As noted by Justice Hugessen in Beloit, supra note 6 at 293, 298:
‘‘Obviousness is an attack on a patent based on its lack of inventiveness.
The attacker says, in effect, ‘Any fool could have done that.’ Anticipation
or lack of novelty, on the other hand, in effect assumes that there has
been an invention but asserts that it has been disclosed to the public
prior to the application for the patent. The charge is: ‘Your invention,
though clever, was already known.’. . . It will be recalled that anticipation,
or lack of novelty, asserts that the invention has been made known to the
public prior to the relevant time. The inquiry is directed to the very
invention in suit and not, as in the case of obviousness, to the state of the
art and to common general knowledge.’’

A recent article by Dr. Andre Picard (‘‘Drug costs jump to $25 billion a
year’’ The Globe and Mail (11 May 2006)), indicated that Canadians
spent $25B on drugs in 2005, an 11 per cent jump in spending from the
previous year. Of this, $20B was spent on prescription drugs compared
to $3B in 1986. Thus, expenditures on prescription drugs increased
~700% over the last 20 years. This amount exceeded that spent on
physician services and is second only to spending on hospitals,
prompting one commentator to refer to the pattern of drug
expenditures as a ‘‘health-care crisis in slow motion’’. Data were from
IMS Health Canada and the CIHI.

104

Francis v. Baker, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250 at para. 35 (QL). The court held that
statutory interpretation principles require that all evidence of legislative
intent be considered provided it is ‘‘relevant and reliable’’.

105

2005 SCC 26, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533 at paras. 156, 157 [Biolyse].

106

Merck & Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1825, 176
F.T.R. 21 at para. 51 (QL). See also Justice Binnie’s comments in Biolyse,
ibid. at para. 46.

107

Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1993. II. 1388
(S.O.R./93-133).

108

Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 2004. II. (S.O.R./93-133
Dec. 11, 2004). See also the June 2006 RIAS: Regulatory Impact Analysis
Statement. Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, C. Gaz. 2006. Vol. 140, No. 24.

109

Biolyse, supra note 105 at para. 171 regarding the 1999 RIAS (C. Gaz.
1999. II. 2357 (S.O.R./99-379). Balancing of competing objectives was
also recently discussed by Justice Binnie in AstraZeneca, supra note 102
at para. 39.

110

Biolyse, supra note 105 at para. 47.

77

Fox, supra note 17 describes the test for anticipation at 100-101: ‘‘Has it
been disclosed before? If there is an earlier specification for the very same
thing, the second invention is not new; but if the two things are different,
the nature and extent of the difference have to be considered. The
question then becomes one of degree. But unless it can be said that the
differences are practically immaterial; that there is no ingenuity in the
second invention, no experiment necessary to show whether it can be
usefully carried out or not, the second cannot be said to have been
anticipated by the first’’. [Emphasis added]

78

Janssen-Ortho Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2006 FC 1234 at para. 112
[Janssen-Ortho].

79

SmithKline Beecham, supra note 15.

26

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

111

Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2003 FCA 24 at
paras. 73-74.

150

Apotex v. Wellcome, supra note 14 at paras 243–245; SmithKline
Beecham, supra note 15 at para. 47.

112

Supra note 108.

151

113

Bouchard, supra note 41.

Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77, [2002] 4 S.C.R.
153 at para. 83 (QL).

114

For a review of normative practices in biomedical litigation as it relates
to patentability, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘‘Obvious to Whom?
Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of the PHOSITA’’ (2004) 19
Berkeley Tech. L. J. 885; Arti Kaur Rai, ‘‘Regulating Scientific Research:
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science’’ (1999) 94 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 77.

152

See Certain Teed, supra note 144 and Wellcome, supra note 125 at 243,
245; Wellcome, supra note 126 at para 83.

153

Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, ‘‘Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle’’
(2004) 54 Case W. Res. L.Rev. 691.

154

127 S. Ct. 617 (2006) [Teleflex] (Brief of the amicus curiae, United States
Solicitor General [Solicitor General’s Brief]). [amicus curiae]

155

383 U.S. 1 (1966) [John Deere].

156

Ibid.

115
116
117
118

Whirlpool, supra note 14 at paras. 42–50; Free World Trust, supra
note 97 at paras. 44–51.
(1989), 26 CPR (3d) 1 (F.C.A.).
[1982] R.P.C. 183 [Catnic].

Ibid. at 242-43. See also, Janssen Pharmaceutica Inc.v. Apotex Inc., 2001
FCA 247; 671905 Alberta Inc. v. Q’Max Solutions Inc., 2003 FCA 241;
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2002 FCA 309; Janssen-Ortho,
supra note 78, citing General Tire & Rubber Company v. Firestone Tyre
& Rubber Company Limited, [1972] R.P.C. 195 at pages 211-12.

157

Patent Act 35 USC 103.

158

Teleflex, supra note 153 (Brief of the amicus curiae, Twenty-Four Law
Professors amicus curiae at 2 [Law Professor’s Brief]).

159

Eisenberg, supra note 114 at 888–892.

160

See e.g., Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstand v. US
International Trade Commission, 705 F.2d 1565 at 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
[Aktiebolaget].

119

Whirlpool, supra note 14 at paras. 49(a) and (b).

120

Ibid. at para. 49(d).

161

Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (U.S. 1851) [Hotchkiss].

121

Evergreening refers to the undue extension of the statutory monopoly
attached to a given patent by means of a series of patents with obvious
or uninventive modifications. The patentee prolongs its monopoly
beyond what the public has agreed to pay: Whirlpool, supra note 14 at
para. 37; Biolyse, supra note 105 at para. 66; AstraZeneca, supra note 102
at para. 39.

162

John Deere, supra note 154 at 12.

163

BMS v. Novopharm, supra note 8; Genentech, supra note 141 and
discussion thereof, supra pp. 27–30.

164

John Deere, supra note 154 at 18.

165

122

Whirlpool supra Note 12, at 49.

Eisenberg, supra note 114 at 889.

166

123

Whirlpool, ibid. at para. 49(g); Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel
(Sask.) Ltd., [1981] 1 SCR 504 at 520-521.

See also Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448 at
454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

167

124

Whirlpool, ibid. at para. 49(h); see discussion in Part III supra.

Aktiebolaget, supra note 159.

168

125

Ibid. at para. 48; Catnic, supra note 117 at 243.

Eisenberg, supra note 114 at 890.

169

126

Supra note 8 at paras. 70–74.

Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 153 at 9-10, 16–18; Law Profs Brief,
supra note 157 at 10, 13.

127

Ibid. at para. 72.

170

128

Supra note 6 at 294.

Ibid. at para. 50.

171

129

Ibid. at para. 70.

Supra note 153 at 15-16. See also Eisenberg, supra note 114 at 888,
897-898.

130

Supra note 14.

172

131

Supra note 56.

John Deere, supra note 154 at 17. See also discussion of same in Solicitor
General’s Brief, supra note 153 at 11.

132

Supra note 50.

173

133

Justice Gibson also included testing that produced new uses or
properties that were superior to those already disclosed, but only singled
out surprising results in his analysis at paragraph 73.

Law Profs Brief, supra note 157 at 6-7. See also Eisenberg, supra note
114 at 888.

174

Hotchkiss, supra note 160 at 267.

175

Apotex v. Wellcome, supra note 14.

176

The court stated that ‘‘ Hotchkiss, by positing the condition that a
patentable invention evidence more ingenuity and skill than that
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
merely distinguished between new and useful innovations that were
capable of sustaining a patent and those that were not. The Hotchkiss
test laid the cornerstone of the judicial evolution suggested by Jefferson
and left to the courts by Congress. The language in the case, and in
those which followed, gave birth to ‘invention’ as a word of legal art
signifying patentable inventions’’. John Deere, supra note 154 at 11.

134

Supra note 42.

135

BMS v. Novopharm, supra note 8 at para. 86.

136

Bayer, supra note 7, at para. 66.

137

2005 FC 1299 at para. 119.

138

Whirlpool, supra note 14 at paras. 42–50; Free World Trust, supra note
97, at 15, 19, 44–51.

139

Sherwin-Williams, supra note 86; Hoffmann-La Roche, supra note 42;
Apotex v. Wellcome, supra note 14; SmithKline Beecham, supra note 15.

177

140

Baldwin International Radio Co. of Canada v. Western Electric Co.,
[1934] S.C.R. 94; Ernest Scragg, supra note 19 at para. 25, Burton Parsons
Chemicals Inc. et al. v. Hewlett-Packard (Canada) Ltd. et al., [1976] 1
S.C.R. 555.

Cuno Corporation v. Automatic Devices Corporation, 314 U.S. 84 at 91
(1941) [Cuno].

178

John Deere, supra note 154 at 16, n. 7.

179

Ibid.

141

SmithKline Beecham, supra note 15 at para. 20.

180

Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 153 at 3.

142

Beecham, supra note 6; Free World Trust, supra note 97; Genentech
Inc.’s Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 147 (C.A.) [Genentech].

181

Law Profs Brief, supra note 157 at 12, referring to Burk & Lemley, supra
note 148.

143

[1963] R.P.C. 61 at 71.

182

144

No-Fume Ltd. v. Pitchford, [1935] 52 R.P.C. 231.

Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health and Welfare) (1997), 76 C.P.R.
(3d) 1 at 5-6 (F.C.A.).

145

Genentech, supra note 141 at 276, 279.

183

146

Supra notes 8, 44 and 49.

Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and
Welfare) (1994), 55 C.P.R. (3d) 302 at 320 (F.C.A.) [Merck Frosst 1994].

147

184

Genentech, supra note 141 at 276, 279.

148

Ibid. at 319; Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 193 at
para. 30, 80 C.P.R. (3d) 368.

Ibid. at 110, 116.

185

149

Re Certain Teed Corp. Patent Application No. 2,055,020, [2004], 39
C.P.R. (4th) 437 at 444 [Certain Teed].

Pharmacia Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)
(1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 209 at 217 (F.C.A.); Merck Frosst 1994, supra note
178 at 320.

Should Scientific Research in the Lead-up to Invention Vitiate Obviousness under the Patented Medicines (NOC) Regulations?

27

186

190

Supra note 86.

187

191

Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and
Welfare), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 193, at para. 33; Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 2005 SCC 26, at
paras. 24 and 146; AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of
Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 2006 SCC 49, at para. 17.

Janssen-Ortho, supra note 78.
Ibid.
188 Janssen-Ortho 2004, supra note 52, aff’d 2005 FCA 6, leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed; Janssen-Ortho Inc. v.
Novopharm Ltd., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 776.
189 Novartis AG v. Apotex Inc., 2002 FCA 440, 22 C.P.R. (4th) 450 at para. 9
(QL).

